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Children and adults may come in contact with the criminal justice system in a myriad 
of ways. Individuals may witness crimes and be called as witnesses; police officers 
often need to make assessments about whether they or those around them are in 
danger; and community members may serve as jurors in civil or criminal cases. In 
each of these contexts, biases in memory and decision making may lead to extreme 
consequences for the suspects and defendants involved. In this thesis, I present three 
studies exploring memory and decision making in diverse contexts. In my first paper, I 
demonstrate that children’s minimal group membership impacts their memories of 
actions committed by in- and out-group members across time. In the second paper, I 
explore two novel interventions aimed at reducing shooting decision inaccuracy in 
mock police officers. Last, I investigate mock juror decision making as a function of 
verdict procedure and find that jurors’ decisions are remarkably similar when jurors 
render a general verdict, or when asked to provide reasons for their decisions before or 
after rendering a general verdict; however, jurors’ decisions are dissimilar when 
rendering a special verdict. Implications for the criminal justice system are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On any given day in the United States, children might be witnesses to minor 
and major crimes, police officers may need to make split-second decisions during 
ambiguous situations as to whether a suspect is armed or unarmed, and civil and 
criminal juries are tasked with making sometimes-arduous decisions. Importantly, 
within each of these highly varied contexts, there is naturally room for error and biases 
in human cognition: children’s memories can be tainted and changed (Bruck, Ceci, & 
Hembrooke, 2002; Bruck & Ceci, 2004; Talwar, Hubbard, Saykaly, Lee, Lindsay, & 
Bala, 2018); shooting decisions can be impacted by racial biases (Correll, Hudson, 
Guillermo, & Ma, 2014; Ross, 2015) and made difficult because of ambiguity (Correll 
et al., 2014); and groups of individuals must grapple with their own and others’ 
perceptions of and opinions regarding complex evidence (Salerno, Bottoms, & Peter-
Hagene, 2017) with the aim of coming to a unanimous group decision (Kaplan & 
Miller, 1987). In this thesis, I present studies examining human cognition and decision 
making across three legally relevant contexts: children’s memories of actions 
perpetrated by in- and out-group members; mock police officer shooting decisions for 
armed and unarmed European and African American suspects; and mock juror 
decision making in a civil context. 
 In my first paper, “The effects of “minimal” group membership in children 
across time,” I explore the impact of minimal group membership on children’s 
memories for actions committed by in- and out-group members across time. I provide 
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initial evidence to suggest that children’s memories of events are in fact biased in 
favor of their in-group over an extended period. Further, children’s memories of out-
group members become less favorable across time, as evidenced by their poorer 
memory of positive out-group actions across time. However, children did not exhibit 
biases in terms of their free-recall or recognition of negative actions committed by in- 
or out-group members during initial or follow-up experimental sessions or when 
comparing such memories across time. 
 In my second paper, “Pulling away from the trigger: The influence of purpose 
in life and self-affirmation on shooting decisions,” I explore whether purpose in life 
and/or self-affirmation writing interventions can improve decision accuracy and 
reduce reaction time for shooting decisions in a first-person shooter video game. I 
demonstrate that purpose in life writing interventions may help reduce shooting 
decision reaction time. Further, I provide evidence to suggest that purpose 
interventions may promote equality in shooting decisions for armed and unarmed 
suspects, and possible mechanisms for these findings are discussed.   
 In my final paper, “Diverging Decisions: A Comparison of Jury Verdict 
Procedures,” I present a study exploring the impact of verdict procedures and racial 
bias on mock juror decision making in a civil case regarding defamation. Here, I 
compare mock juror decisions decided utilizing a general verdict, a special verdict, or 
two variations of a general verdict procedure that require mock jurors provide reasons 
for their decisions. I demonstrate that mock jurors are least likely to find for the 
plaintiff when asked to render a special verdict, while no differences in decision 
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making were found for mock jurors who rendered a general verdict or a general 
verdict with a reasoning requirement.      
 Based on evidence from this research, I conclude with a discussion of the 
important legal implications related to these differences in human cognition across 
these three varied contexts: eyewitness memory, evidence, and testimony; police 
officer decision making during ambiguous contexts; and lastly, the differential impact 
of verdict procedures on jurors’ decision making. I end with a call for future research 
in these areas, and suggestions to improve decision accuracy in these contexts and 
how we perceive children’s eyewitness memory in these contexts.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EFFECTS OF “MINIMAL” GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN CHILDREN ACROSS 
TIME  
 
Young children and adults commonly exhibit in-group preference, even for members 
from novel or minimal groups wherein they have no reason or basis for such 
discrimination. Such preference is evidenced by children’s biases in liking, resource 
allocation, explicit liking, and even memory for in-group members. However, little 
research has examined the impact of such minimal membership on children’s 
memories for actions committed by in- and out-group members across time. Children 
in the current study heard stories involving in- and out-group protagonists and then 
answered a series of free-recall and forced-choice memory assessments. Initial 
evidence is presented that children’s memories of events may be impacted by minimal 
group membership over the span of one or more weeks. Children generally recalled 
more negative than positive actions, but had better recall of positive actions committed 
by in- than out-group members during initial and follow-up experimental sessions. In 
addition, children had poorer recall of positive out-group actions across time. 
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THE EFFECTS OF “MINIMAL” GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN CHILDREN ACROSS 
TIME 
Children’s eyewitness testimony often has probative value in court; however, 
much research suggests that children’s recollections of events may not always be 
accurate, and are susceptible to many external influences (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). Given 
the weight their testimony often carries, it is important for judges, attorneys, and 
others to understand where and when children’s memories might be affected by errors 
or biases in memory. For instance, group membership, even to novel or “minimal” 
groups, has been shown to induce bias in children within a single experimental session 
(e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). However, less is known about what enduring 
impact group membership might have on children’s recollections of events and actions 
perpetrated by in- and out-group members. In the current study, I explore the impact 
of children’s group membership to “minimal” groups on their memories and 
attributions across time. 
Novel and Minimal Groups 
Social psychological research has repeatedly found that mere categorization 
into novel groups can cause in-group favoritism and discrimination against out-group 
members; even randomly assigning members to arbitrary groups results in in-group 
favoritism. In his seminal studies, Tajfel (1970) proposed that discrimination amongst 
groups may occur even when there is no reason (e.g., self-interest) to discriminate 
amongst groups, and that such discrimination might take place even when an 
individual has no preexisting knowledge of or hostility or dislike against a group. In a 
series of experiments, participants of varying ages were assigned to novel groups with 
7 
which they had no prior association; the groups were based on simple categorization 
and after assignment the members were asked to allocate resources to in- and out-
group members (Tajfel, 1970). Even when categorized by “flimsy and unimportant 
criteria,” participants gave more money to in- rather than out-group members (Tajfel, 
1970, p. 101). These and similar experimental procedures are known as minimal group 
paradigms (MGP). 
 In a truly minimal group, participants and minimal in- and out-group members 
never have face-to-face interactions; participants remain completely anonymous. 
Moreover, there is no link between group categorization and responses asked of 
participants, and the responses asked of participants hold no utilitarian value (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Thus, true minimal groups are categorized but are 
value-neutral, and they experience no inter-group competition or differential status, 
and there is no opportunity to interact with in- or out-group members (Dunham et al., 
2011). 
Tajfel and colleagues (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) have argued that group 
membership, even to minimal groups, defines one’s social identity. Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) posits that one’s membership in a group is related to his or her self-
image, which can be based on social categorization and discrimination amongst 
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further, individuals wish to maintain or enhance their 
self-esteem and positive self-concept, and these can be linked to group membership. 
Thus, in order to maintain their social identity, individuals make comparisons amongst 
groups and tend to favor their in-group while differentiating themselves from out-
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Although early research in this area examined adults, 
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more recent evidence for social identity theory has been found in children as well 
(e.g., Nesdale & Flesser, 2001), indicating that group membership has important 
implications for children as well.  
Implications of Group Identity 
While much research has explored the effects of minimal group membership in 
children in a single experimental session, little research has investigated these effects 
across time. This is an important consideration given studies reveal group membership 
can impact children’s behaviors, cognitive processes, attitudes, and memories, but 
lasting impact is what may be most relevant in many applied contexts, including law. 
For instance, children will protect the secrets of novel group members, even when it is 
personally costly to them (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016), will mimic novel group 
members’ behaviors (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016), and will not consistently ask 
reliable out-group members for information, even when their own in-group members 
are unreliable (MacDonald, Schug, Chase, & Barth, 2013). Further, membership in a 
minimal group setting has also been shown to impact children’s resource allocation 
decisions, as they often show in-group favoritism when asked to allocate resources to 
in-and out-group members (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Dunham 
et al., 2011). 
Implicit Attitudes 
A robust body of literature indicates that minimal group membership greatly 
impacts individuals’ implicit attitudes of in- and out-group members (e.g., Ashburn-
Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001). For instance, adults assigned to minimal groups 
show implicit biases in favor of their in-group and are faster to pair pleasant words 
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with their in-group and assign unpleasant words with their out-group on an implicit-
association test (IAT; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001). Children’s assessments, too, of 
unknown individuals are influenced by their minimal group membership. For instance, 
even in a minimal group setting where groups are defined only by t-shirt color 
(randomly assigned), children implicitly prefer in-group members (e.g., Dunham et al., 
2011). 
Explicit Attitudes 
 Research utilizing the MGP suggests that children’s explicit attitudes about 
others can be impacted by group membership. Children as young as four (e.g., 
Hetherington, Hendrickson, & Koenig, 2014) and five (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011) 
explicitly prefer in-group compared to out-group members, and older children (those 
roughly nine years old and older) exhibit this explicit preference for in-group members 
as well (e.g., Abrams et al., 2008). Schug and colleagues found that children’s liking 
of their in-group was not changed when viewing a puppet show depicting an 
egalitarian in-group and a stingy out-group, although their liking of the out-group 
decreased (Schug, Shusterman, Barth, & Patalano, 2013). Further, when their in-group 
was stingy but their out-group was egalitarian, no changes in liking occurred: In all 
conditions, children preferred their in-group to their out-group (Schug et al., 2013). 
These findings suggest that children may come to generalize information and 
expectations about in- and out-group members, even in minimal group settings. In 
contrast, other research has not supported this finding; when children view antisocial 
in-group members, they explicitly like such members less than pro-social out-group 
members or control members (Hetherington et al., 2014).   
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The consequences of minimal group membership do not stop with attitudes and 
behaviors. MGP also impacts individuals’ tendencies to make spontaneous trait 
assessments and behavioral attributions about group members. Otten and Moskowitz 
(2000) found that adults assigned to minimal groups were more likely to infer positive 
traits about their in- compared to out-group and were more likely to positively 
stereotype their in-group, but not likely to derogate the out-group (Otten & 
Moskowitz, 2000). Further, Dunham and colleagues found that, although behavioral 
attributions were a weaker indicator of in-group bias compared to other measures of 
bias (e.g., implicit measures), children assigned negative actions equally to in- and 
out-group members, but were more likely to assign positive actions to in-group 
members (Dunham et al., 2011). Related research indicates children prefer peers who 
share similar beliefs and discriminatorily attribute prosocial behaviors such peers 
(Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2014). Other work indicates that children expect that 
their in-group will be associated with positive future events (Patterson & Bigler, 
2006). 
Memory 
 Generally, social identity and motivation play active roles in individuals’ 
memories of in- and out-group others. In an undergraduate sample utilizing a MGP, 
Bernstein and colleagues (2007) found that participants’ better remember in- 
compared to out-group members (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). Further, 
Van Bavel and Cunningham (2012) utilized a MGP to explore the impact of group 
identity on memory for faces of both in- and out-group members of different races. 
Their work indicates that participants had significantly better recognition memory for 
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in-group faces, regardless of member race, suggesting that even temporary self-
categorization into a minimal group is stronger than the own race bias commonly 
exhibited (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012). Other 
research suggests that individuals have better recognition memory for unfavorable 
actions committed by out-group members than in-group members, while no difference 
exists in recognition memory for favorable actions (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). 
However, if participants are not categorized into a group until after learning about the 
groups, unfavorable actions are more memorable than favorable ones committed by 
both in- and out-group members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). These results provide 
evidence to suggest that categorization into even minimal groups impacts learning and 
encoding of new information. The link between minimal group membership and 
group-dependent memory formation emerges early in development. Dunham and 
colleagues (2011) found that children generally remember more negative than positive 
actions, regardless of group membership. However, positive actions were recalled 
more frequently for in-group members compared to out-group members (Dunham et 
al., 2011). This work suggests that even minimal group membership creates 
selectively-valenced distortions of memory in young children.  
In sum, literature suggests that group membership, even in novel or minimal 
settings, impacts the way that we perceive in- and out-group members, make 
assessments and inferences about member behaviors (which group is more likely to 
attribute bad acts to their in-group), and suggests that group membership has lasting 
consequences for how its members interpret new information.   
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Study Overview 
 The primary purpose of the current study is to build on existing work showing 
the effects of minimal group membership on children’s memory using an experimental 
paradigm to examine children’s memories of actions committed by in- and out-group 
members immediately and also after a delay. As noted above, children’s memories for 
events differ across groups within a single experimental session, but less is known 
about whether minimal group membership has a lasting impact on children’s 
memories of groups across time. Building on previous findings, I hypothesized that: 
(i) children would exhibit the negativity bias found with adults, recalling and 
recognizing more negative than positive actions, regardless of group membership; (ii) 
children would recall and recognize relatively more positive actions for in- as opposed 
to out-group members, and (iii) that these results would hold across time and thus be 
present at two time points, Time I and II. Further, in line with existing research, I 
hypothesized that children would make positive behavioral inferences about minimal 
in-group members, would prefer their in-group members to out-group members, and 
would make spontaneous positive trait assessments about their in-group. Thus, in 
addition to the expected predictions regarding memory, the present study also 
anticipated group differences in trait assessments and behavioral inferences. 
In addition to examining the effects of group membership over time rather than 
at one time-point, the current study extends previous research by using an even more 
minimal paradigm than that used in previous research (Dunham et al., 2011). Previous 
research indicates that children exhibit higher levels of in-group bias and favoritism 
when novel groups are used functionally and are addressed using labels compared to 
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when children are categorized into minimal groups that are not discussed with such 
labels (e.g., Patterson & Bigler, 2006). Further, when noun labels and novel groups are 
used functionally, younger children and those with high self-esteem show exacerbated 
levels of in-group bias when making peer assessments compared to those who do not 
use such labels. The current study tests predictions using a true minimal group 
paradigm, without emphasizing group membership or utilizing noun labels for groups. 
That is, nothing was done to make group membership salient. This was done in order 
to explore how little categorization is needed to induce biases so that we may further 
understand the boundary conditions and roots of such biases to isolate and examine 
effects of group membership independently of labels given to groups. 
Further, the current study also did not suggest competition between minimal 
groups as research suggests that competition reinforces children’s views of social 
categories and influences children’s beliefs about how individuals should and will 
behave within group contexts. Because I am most interested in children’s explicit 
biases and in examining such biases of memory in a truly minimal setting, no such 
procedures were used. 
Methods 
Design 
 The current study utilized a within-participant design. All participants were 
randomly assigned to a group using t-shirts of different colors (orange vs. green vs. 
yellow t-shirts). In the experimental groups, children heard stories and made 
assessments of both in- and out-group members. In the control group, children heard 
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stories and made assessments of out-group members only (these children never saw 
members of their own in-group). 
Participants 
 Participants in the current study were 62 children, ranging in age from 4 - 11 
years of age (M = 6.5, SD = 2.33). A large age range was chosen in order to explore 
age-related effects of minimal group membership. Recent research indicates that, 
while group preference (“in-group love”) may be seen in young children, out-group 
derogation (“out-group hate’) is seen only in older children, beginning around six 
years of age (Buttelmann & Bohm, 2014). Thus, the current age range would allow for 
the exploration of attribution across development.  
The sample consisted of 34 female and 27 male children (no gender provided 
for one child). Children were recruited from local daycare centers and afterschool 
programs. The sample was primarily European American (64.8% European American, 
14.8% Asian, 3.7% Hispanic, 1.9% African American, and 14.8% “Other”). All data 
collection took place in the daycare or afterschool setting. Children were recruited in-
person and via letters sent home through the daycares and afterschool programs to 
parents, and consent was obtained in advance of testing. All children received stickers 
for their participation at Time I and Time II. 
Procedure 
 During the first testing session (Time I), children met with an experimenter and 
were shown three buttons (green, orange, and yellow). The experimenter then placed 
the buttons in a bag, mixed them up, and asked the child to reach into the bag to select 
a button. This button corresponded with the child’s group membership for the duration 
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of the study. The child was then asked to wear a t-shirt that corresponded to the color 
of the button selected. Children were then told that they would hear stories about and 
view pictures of children in different colored t-shirts. Children who selected yellow 
buttons were placed into a control condition: These children never viewed photos or 
heard stories of members of their in-group. Importantly, noun labels were never used 
during the group categorization process (e.g., “your group” or “the other group”). 
Children were told simply that they would be wearing a t-shirt while participating in 
several activities and that they would view other children wearing different colored t-
shirts. 
 Children then sat in front of a laptop computer and heard two stories while 
viewing an image of a gender-matched protagonist. Children heard one story 
referencing an in-group member (same colored t-shirt) and one of an out-group 
member (other colored t-shirt), except for children in the control, who never heard a 
story about an in-group member. The photo of the protagonist was shown on the 
laptop screen for the duration of the story, and the experimenter read the stories to the 
children.  
In each story, the protagonist engaged in two positive (e.g., shared a toy, 
helped clean up) and two negative acts (e.g., broke something, tripped someone), for a 
total of four acts per story. The stories were counterbalanced so that the order of the 
stories (in-group story first vs. out-group story first) and story pairing (whether a story 
was paired with an in- or out-group member) varied between subjects. Stories were 
written as short narratives and were each roughly 170 words in length (168 – 173 
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words, See appendix A). After hearing the stories, children were led through several 
measures, described below. 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were eight color photos of European American children (four boys and 
four girls). The photos were cropped to the head and shoulder, and all children wore 
black hats and had neutral facial expressions (Dalrymple, Gomez, & Duchaine, 2013). 
Photographs were edited using computer software such that half of the children wore 
either orange or green t-shirts, for a total of two boys and two girls per colored t-shirt 
group. Photos were gender-matched to the children such that girls always saw photos 
of girls and boys always saw photos of boys (See appendix B). 
Measures for Time I 
 All measures were presented in a fixed order. While some measures discussed 
below seem conceptually similar (e.g., behavioral attributions, explicit liking), a factor 
analysis was not used as these variables were chosen based on prior research 
indicating they each tap some unique variance (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011). All 
questions were read aloud to the children.  
 Free Recall. Immediately after hearing the two stories, children were asked 
free-recall questions. They were first asked to recall everything they could remember 
from the stories. When they were finished, they were prompted to recall any additional 
information they remembered from the stories. Next, they were asked to recall 
anything good that the children did in the stories followed by anything bad the 
children did. Children spoke for as long as they wanted. When they were finished, the 
experimenter began the next task. 
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Forced-Choice Memory Assessment. Next, children were asked a series of 
eight forced-choice memory questions regarding the stories. The photos of the two 
protagonists appeared on the screen, side by side, and children were then asked which 
of the children committed a particular action from the story (e.g., Which child stole a 
toy? Which child brought cookies?). The presentation of these questions was 
randomized. Further, for half of the questions, the in-group member appeared first 
while for the other half, the out-group member appeared first. 
Behavioral Attributions. Next, children completed eight trials where they 
made forced-choice behavioral predictions about target photos. The photos of one in- 
and one out-group member appeared on the screen, side by side, and children were 
then asked which of the children would commit a certain act (e.g., Which of these 
children would receive the most time-outs? Which of these children would be most 
likely to help a friend?). The stimuli for this task included the images of the two 
protagonists from the stories and two new children for a total of two in- and two out-
group members. The presentation of these questions was randomized. Further, for half 
of the questions the in-group member appeared first while for the other half the out-
group member appeared first. 
Explicit Liking. Children next completed four trials of an explicit liking task. 
First, the experimenter presented the child with a smiley face Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (a frowning face) to 5 (a very smiley face). Children were told that 1 indicated 
they really did not like the child while 5 meant they really liked the child. Children 
were asked to point to the smiley face that showed how much they liked each child. 
Once children acknowledged the instructions, a single face appeared on the screen of 
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either an in- or out-group member, and children were asked to point to the smiley 
which indicated how much they liked the child. Such scales have been commonly used 
in research, and children exhibit an understanding of how to use such scales (e.g., 
Bregant, Shaw, & Kinzler, 2016; Olson, Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006). There were 
a total of four trials, and all in- and out-group members were shown, and children’s 
forced-choice responses were recorded. The presentation of these questions was 
randomized. 
Trait Assessment. Children next completed eight trials of a trait assessment 
task. The photos of one in- and one out-group member appeared on the screen, side by 
side, and children were asked which of the children matched a trait (e.g., Which of 
these children is friendly? Which of these children is mean?). Children’s forced-choice 
responses were recorded. The presentation of these questions was randomized. 
Further, for half of the questions, the in-group member appeared first while for the 
other half the out-group member appeared first.  
Group Preference. Children then completed three forced-choice group 
assessment measures (e.g., Which group would you want to be in?) and were asked to 
pick either the orange or green group. The presentation of these questions was 
randomized. Next, children were thanked for their time, given a sticker, and told that 
the experimenter would return in roughly one week. 
Measures for Time II 
 At a follow up session, which occurred roughly one week after the first session 
(Range: 3 – 21 days, M = 8.53, SD = 3.48), children met with an experimenter again. 
Every attempt was made to ensure that the experimenter remained the same for both 
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sessions. Importantly, children’s minimal group was not reintroduced at this time; 
children did not wear colored t-shirts for the second experimental sessions. First, 
children were asked to complete the free-recall memory tasks as described above. 
Next, they completed the forced-choice memory assessment as described above. 
Lastly, children were thanked for their time, given a sticker, and were debriefed.  
Results 
Free Recall 
 Time I. First, analyses were conducted to compare free recall of total positive 
and negative actions recalled and total accuracy of actions recalled between 
experimental and control participants. On average, children accurately recalled 2.19 
actions (SD = 1.70). No differences were found between the experimental and control 
groups, F (1, 59) = .001, p = .98, np2 < .001. As predicted, among participants in both 
the experimental and control groups, more negative actions were recalled (M = 1.36, 
SD = 1.08) than positive actions (M = .87, SD = .92, F (1, 59) = 8.74, p = .004, np2 = 
.13). Accuracy improved with increasing age, β = .62, p < .001.  
Again, as predicted, analyses revealed that children recalled significantly more 
positive actions for in- (M = .49, SD = .62) versus out-group members (M = .43, SD = 
.65, F (1, 46) = 10.41, p = .002, np2 = .19). However, analyses revealed no difference 
between negative actions recalled for in-group (M = .79, SD = .78) versus out-group 
members (M = .62, SD = .64, F (1, 46) = 1.44, p = .24, np2 = .03).  
Time II. First, analyses were conducted to compare free recall of total positive 
and negative actions recalled and total accuracy of actions recalled between 
experimental and control participants. No differences were found between groups, F 
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(1, 51) = .12, p = .74, np2 = .002. Among participants in both the experimental and 
control groups, there was a trend for participants to recall more negative (M = .96, SD 
= 1.02) than positive actions (M = .66, SD = .88, F (1, 51) = 3.76, p = .06, np2 = .07). 
On average, children accurately recalled 1.65 actions (SD = 1.67). Accuracy improved 
with increasing age, β = .43, p = .003. 
Analyses revealed that children recalled significantly more positive actions for 
in-group (M = .44, SD = .64) versus out-group members (M = .23, SD = .49, F (1, 38) 
= 4.75, p = .04, np2 = .11. However, no difference was found between negative actions 
recalled for in-group (M = .46, SD = .68) versus out-group members (M = .54, SD = 
.68, F (1, 38) = .37, p = .55, np2 = .01).  
Time I versus Time II. Analyses revealed no difference in recall of positive in-
group actions across time (F (1, 39) = 2.58, p = .12, np2 = .06) or negative in-group 
actions across time, F (1, 39) = 2.58, p = .12, np2 = .06. However, there is evidence of 
a reduction in recall of positive out-group actions across time: Participants recalled 
fewer positive actions involving the out-group at Time II (M = .23, SD = .49) 
compared to Time I (M = .39, SD = .63, F (1, 38) = 8.16, p = .007, np2 = .18). 
However, there was no difference in free-recall of negative out-group actions across 
time, F (1, 38) = 1.72, p = .20, np2 = .04. Figure 1 presents mean recall by valence and 
group across time. 
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Figure 1: Mean number of actions recalled by valence (positive vs. negative) and 
group (in-group vs. out-group) out of four total actions across time. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the means. 
 
Forced-Choice Memory Assessment 
 
 Time I. First, analyses were conducted to compare recognition of total positive 
and negative actions recognized and total accuracy of actions recognized between 
experimental and control participants. No differences were found between groups in 
terms of overall accuracy, F (1, 59) = .52, p = .47, np2 = .01. There were no 
differences between the experimental and control groups in recognition of positive (F 
(1, 59) = 1.05, p = .31, np2 = .02) or negative actions, F (1, 59) = .004, p = .95, np2 < 
.001. On average, children accurately recognized 4.02 actions (SD = 1.97). Accuracy 
did not improve with age, β = -.08, p = .57.  
Analyses revealed no difference between positive actions recognized for in- 
versus out-group members (F (1, 46) = .11, p = .75, np2 = .002) and no difference 
between negative actions recalled for in- versus out-group members, F (1, 46) = .01, p 
= .91, np2 < .001.  
Time II. First, analyses were conducted to compare recognition of total 
positive and negative actions recognized and total accuracy of actions recognized 
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between experimental and control participants. No differences were found between 
groups in terms of total recognition accuracy, F (1, 51) = .74, p = .39, np2 = .01. 
Among participants in both the experimental and control groups, there was no 
difference between recognition of positive (F (1, 51) = .32, p = .57, np2 = .01) or 
negative actions, F (1, 51) = .14, p = .71, np2 = .003. On average, children accurately 
recognized 3.74 actions (SD = 1.87).  
Analyses revealed no difference between positive actions recognized for in- 
versus out-group members (F (1, 39) = .20, p = .66, np2 = .005) and no difference 
between negative actions recognized for in- versus out-group members, F (1, 39) < 
.001, p = 1, np2  < .001. Once again, recognition accuracy did not improve with age, β 
= -.13, p = .38. 
Time I versus Time II. Analyses revealed no difference in recognition of 
positive in-group actions across time (F (1, 39) = .01, p = .92, np2 < .001) or negative 
in-group actions across time, F (1, 39) = .58, p = .45, np2 = .02. Further, no differences 
were found in recognition of positive out-group actions across time (F (1, 39) = .09, p 
= .76, np2 = .002) or negative out-group actions across time, F (1, 39) = .65, p = .43, 
np2 = .02. Figure 2 presents mean recognition by valence and group across time. 
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Figure 2: Mean number of actions recognized by valence (positive vs. negative) and 
group (in-group vs. out-group) out of four total actions across time. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the means. 
 
False Memory 
Categorizing false memory. Where participants remembered something that 
did not happen, this was categorized as a false memory. Where participants had a false 
memory this was categorized as false memory for a positive act, false memory for a 
neutral act, or false memory for a negative act. Each participant was given a score for 
their total false memory for positive, negative, and neutral acts from their in-group, 
and total false memory for positive, negative, and neutral acts from their out-group.  
Time I. First, an analysis of variance was conducted to compare types of false 
memory for in-group and out-group members.  This analysis had two within-subjects 
factors – type of false memory (negative, neutral, or positive) and group false memory 
(in-group, or out-group). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of type of 
false memory, F (2, 60) = 5.77, p = .005, np2 < .16. Participants had significantly more 
false memories for negative actions than for neutral actions (Mnegative = .10, SE = .03, 
Mneutral = .02, SE =  .01, p = .028).  
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Time II. This analysis was also conducted using the Time II data. At this time 
point there was no longer a significant main effect of type of false memory (p = .66). 
There was a marginally significant two-way interaction between type of false memory 
and group false memory. This interaction is displayed in Figure 3. It suggests that 
participants had more negative false memory for their in-group, and more positive 
false memory for their out-group, although follow-up pairwise comparisons did not 
indicate significant differences. 
 
 
Figure 3. Marginally significant two-way interaction between false memory type and 
group false memory was regarding. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.  
 
Behavioral Attributions 
Behavioral attributions were measured at Time I only. Unexpectedly, there was 
no difference between children’s perceptions of which group would be more likely to 
commit good acts, F (1, 46) = .05, p = .82, np2 = .001. In contrast to our expectation, 
children were more likely to attribute bad acts to their in-group (M = 2.04, SD = 1.22) 
compared to the out-group (M = 1.85, SD = 1.18, F (1, 46) = 6.24, p = .02, np2 = .102. 
Figure 4 presents children’s behavioral attributions.  
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Figure 4: Behavioral attributions by valence (positive vs. negative) and group (in-
group vs. out-group) out of four total actions. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the means. 
 
Group Preference and Explicit Liking 
Children did not show explicit preference for their groups. In the experimental 
condition, 47 children responded to questions of preference regarding in- and out-
group members. When asked which group they would like to be in, which group they 
would like to play with, and which group they would trust, children showed no group 
preference, χ2 = .58, p = .97. Overall, they did not show an explicit preference for their 
in-group (M = 3.23, SD = 1.15) compared to their out-group (M = 3.05, SD = 1.13, t 
(46) = 1.03, p = .31). Figure 5 presents children’s mean explicit liking scores. 
 
Figure 5: Mean explicit liking by group (in-group vs. out-group) out of 10. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the means. 
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Trait Assessment 
 
Trait assessments were measured at Time I only. Unexpectedly, there was no 
difference between children’s perceptions of which group was associated with positive 
traits between the in-group (M = 2.30, SD = 1.38) and out-group (M = 1.55, SD = 
1.36), F (1, 46) = 2.00, p = .16, np2 = .04. Further, there was also no difference 
between children’s perceptions of which group was associated with negative traits 
between the in-group (M = 1.55, SD = 1.22) and out-group, M = 2.04, SD = 1.27, F 
(1, 46) = 1.18 p = .28, np2 = .03. No age effects were found for either positive (F (1, 
40) = 1.31, p = .26, np2 = .03) or negative trait assessment (F (1, 40) = .05, p = .95, 
np2 < .001). Figure 6 presents children’s group trait assessments. 
 
Figure 6: Mean trait assessments by valence (positive vs. negative) and group (in-
group vs. out-group) out of four total traits. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
means. 
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children heard stories about both in- and out-group members detailing positive and 
negative actions, their free-recall was biased in favor of their in-group at both Time I 
and II, as evidenced by their recalling more positive actions committed by in- versus 
out-group members. This has important implications given the truly minimal group 
induction utilized in the current study: In view of the fact that children were never 
asked to name their group, categorize themselves or group members, nor were they 
given noun labels for their groups, their recall for their in-group were biased across 
time in the predicted direction. 
At Time I and II, children in both the experimental and control groups recalled 
more negative than positive actions, replicating Dunham et al. (2011). As expected, at 
Time I and II, there was no difference in recall for negative actions committed by in- 
or out-group members, but children did recall more positive actions committed by in- 
versus out-group members. Further, children experienced reduced recall of positive 
out-group actions across time. In contrast, their recall for in-group members did not 
differ across time. This is an important new finding and may suggest that, over time, 
children begin to generally associate more positive actions with their in-group 
compared to the out-group. Children may not be able to easily recall specific actions 
across time, but may have an abstract sense that their in-group is preferred over an 
out-group. Sherman and colleagues (1998) found that, for positive actions committed 
by in-group members and negative actions committed by out-groups members, 
participants do not recall specifics, but rather retrieve general conceptions of their 
group.  
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However, there were no differences found between recognition of positive and 
negative events, and accuracy was generally quite high for all groups for both positive 
and negative actions. This may suggest that although children’s free recall begins to 
show in-group bias across time, their recognition accuracy remains high and, under 
these truly minimal conditions, is less likely to become distorted by group 
membership. As noted above, significant effects were seen for free-recall but not 
recognition memory. This suggests membership in minimal groups may not actually 
distort children’s underlying memory, but rather, that it affects their ease of retrieval. 
Recall entails more effortful retrieval processes, and perhaps this disjunction shows 
that minimal group membership provides an easy default retrieval cue that is used 
when the actual cue is not provided as it is in a recognition paradigm. Thus, the 
contrast between the in-group superiority for free recall over recognition may reflect 
the use of a schema to guide recollection that is preempted by the availability of the 
cue inherent in the recognition test, which obviates the need for stereotypes, schemas, 
and scripts in support of the retrieval of actions (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984). 
While there was no difference between children’s inferences about which 
group would be likely to commit positive acts, children were more likely to attribute 
negative acts to their in-group compared to out-group. Similarly, there was no 
difference in children’s spontaneous trait inferences in regards to positive traits 
associated with their in- or out-group. Previous research also found no difference 
between children’s inferences about negative traits associated with in- or out-group 
members (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). However, these results stand in contrast to 
research by Dunham and colleagues (Dunham et al., 2011) who found that children 
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were more likely to attribute positive traits to in-group members, and in contrast to 
Patterson and Bigler (2006) who found that children expect their in-group to be 
associated with positive future events. In the current study, an even more minimal 
group induction than those used by Dunham and colleagues (2011) or Patterson and 
Bigler (2006) was utilized. Further, Dunham and colleagues (2011) found that 
behavioral attributions were a weaker measure of group bias compared to implicit 
measures, even using a stronger group categorization than those methods used here.  
In line with previous research, children trended to prefer their in-group 
compared to their out-group. However, in contrast to previous work (e.g., Abrams et 
al., 2008; Dunham et al., 2011; Hetherington, Hendrickson, & Koenig, 2014; Schug et 
al., 2013), children in the current study did not explicitly like their in-group more than 
their out-group. These differences, too, may be explained by the extremely minimal 
group induction used in the current study. Further, children in the story stimuli used in 
the current study engaged in negative actions (e.g., tripping), which may have made a 
strong impression on children. Hetherington and colleagues (2014) found that anti-
social in-group members were liked less than prosocial out-group members and 
controls. This may lend to support to our finding that children’s in-groups in the 
current study were not explicitly preferred to their out-group in Time I, when their 
memories of negative actions committed by their group were still fresh. Truly minimal 
induction procedures like those utilized here may be too weak to induce such group 
bias in one experimental session. Further, many of the children in the current sample 
were quite young (~4 years old), and research by Aboud (2003) suggests that bias is 
stronger for children ages 5 and 6 compared to those younger than 5. 
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Importantly, the current study suggests that even extremely minimal group 
inductions can cause distortions in perceptions across time. Previous research has 
utilized explicit labels (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011, Experiment 2; Hetherington et al., 
2014) and competition (e.g., Abrams et al., 2003) during minimal group induction, but 
children in our sample were never given an explicit label to their in- or out-groups. 
Further, children were not reminded of their group membership at Time II, and yet, 
their memories for actions committed by their in-group were still distorted across time.  
Future research should examine individual differences that might exacerbate 
in-group favoritism in such minimal settings. Further, future work should explore 
what traits or processes might disrupt the rapid emergence of such biases, even in such 
weak settings. Finally, future research should investigate how lasting of an impact 
minimal group membership makes on individuals across the lifespan. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PULLING AWAY FROM THE TRIGGER: THE INFLUENCE OF PURPOSE IN 
LIFE AND SELF-AFFIRMATION ON SHOOTING DECISIONS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent data suggests large racial disparities in police killings in the U.S. (Swaine & 
McCarthy, 2017). It is important to explore ways to reduce racial biases, which in turn 
may lead to a reduction in wrongful shootings. The current study explored the impact 
of self-affirmation and purpose in life on mock police officer decisions to shoot. 
Participants completed a writing task (Self-affirmation vs. Purpose in Life vs. Control) 
and then participated in a simple first-person shooter video game, where they were 
asked to shoot armed suspects and not to shoot unarmed suspects varying in race 
(African American vs. European American). Participants in the control and self-
affirmation conditions were more accurate in their decisions regarding armed versus 
unarmed suspects, while individuals in the purpose condition were equally accurate. 
Further, decision accuracy was worse for unarmed compared to armed African 
American suspects, while no differences in accuracy were found for European 
American suspects. Shooting decision reaction time was also significantly reduced for 
participants in the purpose compared to self-affirmation or control conditions. 
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PULLING AWAY FROM THE TRIGGER: THE INFLUENCE OF PURPOSE IN 
LIFE AND SELF-AFFIRMATION ON SHOOTING DECISIONS 
 
On any given day, individuals may confront threats and stressors, big and 
small (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, some individuals may be more likely to 
experience or perceive threat or stress due to situational factors, including their 
occupation. Police officers, for instance, may experience stressors related to 
organizational practices (e.g., paperwork, politics within a department), and 
importantly, to specific factors of the work itself (e.g., experiencing a colleague being 
killed) (e.g., Violanti & Aron, 1995). Evidence from one study suggests that the 
leading stressor for police officers is the fear of killing someone while on duty, while 
the fear of being attacked follows as a close second (Violanti & Aron, 1995). These 
stressors and perceptions of threat may relate to officer-involved shootings and 
improper shootings. Fatal officer-involved shootings have risen over the past decade, 
but data involving the situational factors relating to these decisions to shoot is lacking 
(Burch & Cave, 2017). What factors might impact officers’ decisions to shoot and 
shooting decision accuracy? Further, can decision accuracy be improved? 
Police officers, like the general public, may hold implicit racial biases, which 
can impact decisions to shoot and shooting reaction time (Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, 
& Ma, 2014). Further, police officers are often required to interact with a diverse 
general public, who may be armed or unarmed. Thus, officers may sometimes be in a 
position to make split-second decisions based on their own discretion and perceptions 
of threat, and must quickly make decisions as to whether to shoot suspects in 
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ambiguous situations. Implicit biases in police officers may lead to tragic 
consequences in decisions to shoot. Recent data suggests large racial disparities in 
police killings in the US (Swaine & McCarthy, 2017). In 2016, black males were nine 
times more likely to be killed by police officers compared to other Americans, and 
four times more likely than young white men (Swaine & McCarthy, 2017). 
Importantly, 169 unarmed individuals were killed by police in 2016 (Swaine & 
McCarthy, 2017). It is important to explore ways to reduce implicit racial biases, 
which in turn might lead to a reduction of wrongful shootings.  
Research suggests that purpose in life and self-affirmation can help individuals 
to combat negative feelings and behaviors that result from experiencing threats and 
stressors, and can help buffer against stress (Burd & Burrow, 2017). Thus, purpose in 
life and self-affirmation might serve as useful interventions for individuals confronting 
stressful situations generally, and those who must confront their discomfort with 
diversity. Given that purpose in life and self-affirmation can help reduce discomfort 
with diversity and reactivity to and recovery from threat, these interventions may have 
important implications for police officers’ decisions to shoot. In the current study, I 
investigate the impact of purpose in life and self-affirmation writing interventions on 
mock police officer decisions to shoot, shooting accuracy, and decision response time. 
Perceptions of Threat, Police Use of Force, and Police Shooting Decisions 
Many factors impact police officers’ decisions to use force. One study 
exploring the situational factors relating to police use of force found that both 
encounter and suspect characteristics play a large role in officers’ decisions to use 
force (Bolger, 2015). “Encounter” characteristics are those involving factors related to 
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the interaction between the officer and a suspect (e.g., seriousness of the offense, 
whether the suspect resists or is arrested, officer perceptions of dangerousness) 
(Bolger, 2015). Work by Bolger (2015) suggests that seriousness of the offense, 
suspect resistance, citizens involvement in the conflict, and involvement of other 
police officers all relate to an increased likelihood of use of force. In terms of suspect 
characteristics, use of force is more likely when suspects are male, minorities, from a 
lower social class, or hostile (Bolger, 2015). Importantly, many encounter and suspect 
characteristics are subjective and open to the discretion of the officer to report. Thus, 
given this line of work, perceptions of threat may relate to use of force.  
 Threat can take many forms and can impact individuals’ perceptions and 
behaviors in important ways. One source of threat that may be pertinent to police 
officers, among others, is discomfort with diversity. Much research indicates that 
individuals perceive threat from increasing diversity (e.g., Burrow et al., 2013, 2014a; 
Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). In one study, Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) 
found that as the percentage of African Americans in the population increased, 
Caucasian Americans perceptions of threat increased, and their support for integration 
decreased. Relatedly, work by Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, and Schmidt (2004) suggests 
that as the perceived size of foreign populations increases, citizens’ experience 
increased threat and are more likely to endorse exclusionary practices. Further, 
perceived threat was associated with lower education and income, and blue-collar job 
status (Semyonov et al., 2004). Contemporary research suggests that exposure to 
increasing diversity induces implicit and explicit racial biases in white Americans, 
including the expression of negative attitudes (Craig & Richeson, 2014a), and 
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increases white Americans’ endorsement of conservative policies, regardless of prior 
political affiliation (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Further, similar trends were seen in 
non-Hispanic minorities confronted with increasing diversity driven primarily by a 
growth in the Hispanic population (Craig & Richeson, in press). These perceptions of 
threat can impact all citizens, but they may play an important role in understanding 
improper shootings by police officers.  
 Importantly, police and others may be aware of their biases, and may fear 
being prejudiced (for a review, see Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009). Although 
counterintuitive, concern over appearing prejudiced is associated with increased stress 
when individuals encounter out-group members. In one study, researchers found that 
Caucasian Americans who are concerned with appearing prejudiced experience 
increases in cortisol and anxiety when interacting with out-group members, and those 
who are highly externally motivated not to be prejudiced experienced an increase in 
stress and anxiety over time and show indications of chronic stress (Trawalter, Adam, 
Chase-Lansdale, & Richeson, 2012). However, individuals who are internally 
motivated not to be prejudiced did not show the same pattern, and contact with diverse 
others reduced their anxiety over time (Trawalter et al., 2012). This line of research is 
important to note as police officers, for many reasons, may be externally motivated not 
be prejudiced. They are constantly in the public eye and may be keenly aware of 
citizens’ perceptions of their behavior and judgments, which may exacerbate their 
perceptions of threat regarding minorities.  
 Additionally, situational and social influences can intensify racial tensions. 
Richeson and Ambady (2003) found that when Caucasian females are assigned the 
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role of a superior to an African American, their scores on a race Implicit-Association 
Test (IAT) were higher than when they were assigned as a subordinate to an African 
American. However, there was no difference when Caucasians were assigned either 
role in relationship to another Caucasian (Richeson & Ambady, 2003). Similarly, 
other research suggests that participants’ scores on a race IAT were lower when the 
administering experimenter was African American compared to Caucasian, and also 
when African American experimenters instructed participants not to be prejudiced 
(Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). In situations involving police officers and 
civilians, there is always an imbalance of power. These studies suggest that implicit 
racial biases may be exacerbated by this power differential when Caucasian officers 
encounter minorities, and that Caucasian civilians might show deference to African 
American police officers as they may exhibit less racial bias after encountering an 
African American in power.  
 Relatedly, Judd, Blair, and Chapleau (2004) explored individuals’ associations 
between ethnicities and various objects. They found that African American faces were 
more closely associated with handguns and sports objects than Caucasian faces. 
Similarly, Payne found that participants are more likely to mistake tools as guns 
following the presentation of African American faces compared to Caucasian faces 
(2001, 2005) and more likely to pair “bad” with African Americans and “good” with 
Caucasian Americans (2005). Further, Payne (2001) found that Caucasians were also 
faster at identifying guns following the presentation of an African American face. 
Importantly, Payne (2005) discovered that these biases were worse when participants 
had low cognitive control, and although individuals with high and low control were 
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equally biased, those with high executive control were less likely to express their 
biases in behaviors and judgments. 
Social psychological research has begun to examine the impact of implicit 
racial biases on shooting decisions involving minority suspects. Several groups of 
researchers have found that participants who simulate shooting decisions “correctly” 
fire at armed black men more quickly than armed white men (e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, 
& Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll, Urland, & Ito, 2006; Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 
2003), decide correctly not to shoot unarmed white men more quickly than unarmed 
black men (e.g., Correll et al., 2002, 2006), mistakenly shoot unarmed black suspects 
more than unarmed white suspects (e.g., Correll et al., 2002, 2006; Greenwald et al., 
2003), and incorrectly fail to shoot armed white men more than armed black men (e.g., 
Correll et al., 2002, 2006). This research suggests that participants have a lower 
decision criterion for shooting African Americans versus Caucasians (Correll et al., 
2002), and that race impacts perceptual abilities such that individuals have trouble 
distinguishing weapons from non-weapons when suspects are African American 
(Greenwald et al., 2003).  
Much research suggests the strength of ones’ biases and negative stereotypes 
of minorities impacts shooting decisions (e.g., Sadler, Correll, Park, & Judd, 2012) 
and shooting decision reaction times (e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, Wittenbrink, Sadler, & 
Keesee, 2007). Correll and colleagues found that shooter bias was more pronounced in 
individuals with strong negative stereotypes about African Americans and who 
perceive these individuals as aggressive and violent (Correll et al., 2002, 2006), and in 
those who have had more contact with African Americans (Correll et al., 2002). 
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Generally, sensitivity to race predicts the strength of the shooter bias, with ones’ 
perceptions of cultural stereotypes leading to increased sensitivity to race, which in 
turn predicts shooter bias (Correll et al., 2006). Overall, Correll and colleagues argue 
that response inhibition is the key to such decisions: Many individuals experience 
implicit bias, but those who feel threatened and are unable to inhibit the improper 
response are those who are more likely to exhibit greater shooter bias (Correll et al., 
2006).   
Other research comparing shooting decisions amongst officers and community 
members indicates that, although both samples are racially biased, police officers 
make more accurate shooting decisions than civilians (Correll et al., 2007). In this 
work, officers were faster than civilians in their decisions to shoot, and officers were 
better able to differentiate amongst armed and unarmed suspects compared to 
community members. Still, both samples were slower when making decisions about 
unarmed black suspects and armed white suspects. In officers, bias scores were 
positively related to city and county population size, amount of violent crime in the 
community served, and percentage of minority members within the community. 
Importantly, in one sample of officers, bias scores were negatively related to years on 
the force. Thus, years of training may decrease the effects of racial biases in officers. 
 In work exploring racial biases and perceptions of time, Moskowitz, Okten, 
and Gooch (2015) found that, for some whites, perception of time slows when viewing 
black men. When whites are concerned about perceptions of racial bias, they perceive 
that they view a black face longer than they do in reality. Thus, those who are highly 
externally motivated to control prejudice, which some police officers may be, are 
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actually susceptible to perceptual inaccuracies, which may make shooting decisions 
even more challenging. If, for example, an officer perceives that they have waited an 
appropriate amount of time before making a shooting decision, they may in fact 
inaccurately perceive how much time has passed when viewing a minority suspect. In 
turn, they may be too quick to the trigger.  
Mixed Results 
It should be noted that several studies have cast doubts about the IAT’s 
predictive validity (e.g., Blanton, Jaccard, Klick, Mellers, Mitchell, & Tetlock, 2009) 
and temporal stability (Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017), and debates 
regarding these issues have been widespread (e.g., Goldhill, 2017; Payne, Niemi, & 
Doris, 2018). Further, some research specifically exploring the impact of implicit 
racial biases (as measured by the IAT) on simulated police shooting decisions found 
no relationship between IAT scores and shooting decisions (James, James, & Vila, 
2016). Thus, a growing body of research suggests caution should be used when 
considering the use of the IAT for diagnostic or intervention/training purposes (e.g., 
Vorauer, 2012). However, much research utilizing various other measures of implicit 
bias show clear patterns, suggesting that individuals’ perceptions are in fact impacted 
by implicit racial biases (e.g., Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). Proponents of 
the IAT argue that it was never intended to predict individuals’ behaviors, but rather, 
to predict average outcomes across larger groups (Payne et al., 2018). 
In addition to the debates surrounding the predictive validity and reliability of 
the IAT, research examining the impact of implicit racial biases on shooting decisions 
has produced mixed results. For instance, as mentioned above, James and colleagues 
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(2016) found evidence in a laboratory study that, although police officers were in fact 
implicitly racist (as measured by the “race/weapons” version of the IAT), officers 
were slower to make shooting decisions regarding African American suspects 
compared to European American suspects, and were less likely to shoot unarmed 
African American suspects compared to European American suspects. Further, 
utilizing data from actual police use of force, Fryer (2018) found that, although non-
lethal use of force was substantially higher for minority suspects compared to 
European American suspects, police showed no racial disparities in officer-involved 
shootings. In contrast, Nix, Campbell, Byers, and Alpert (2016), found that 15% of 
African Americans shot and killed were unarmed compared to 6% of European 
Americans who were unarmed at the time of their death. Further, Nix and colleagues 
found that a large percentage of African Americans killed by police in 2015 (24%) 
were not attacking police officers or others when they were shot, due to what the 
authors describe as “threat perception failure” (p 17).  
Summarizing the disparities across these studies, Fridell (2016) argues that 
discrepancies among the data in these studies are the result of differences in 
operationalizations of key variables, geographic differences in where data were 
collected, and the selection of police-use-of-force incidents selected. For instance, 
Fridell (2016) discusses Fryer’s study (2018) and characterizes his random sample of 
incidents involving arrests as “problematic” (p 507), as several are likely to involve 
police use of force (e.g., “attempted capital murder of a public safety officer”), while 
others are significantly less likely to instigate police use of force (e.g., evading arrest). 
Further, Fridell (2016) argues that the data utilized in the above studies vary 
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considerably by jurisdiction, with some studies showing evidence of bias in police 
(e.g., those using data from New York City), while others show little to no evidence of 
bias in shooting decisions (e.g., those using data from Houston). Regarding these 
inconsistencies in data across geographic locations, Fridell argues “This raises 
concerns about the veracity of conclusions drawn from national data” (p 509). Lastly, 
Fridell (2016) argues that several of the above studies do not account for the level of 
resistance officers faced in these encounters, which has been shown to be a powerful 
predictor of use of force. While keeping in mind the differences in results amongst 
these studies, the question remains: What, if anything, might help mitigate racial 
biases and improve police officer decision making? 
Purpose in Life 
Purpose in life is a “central, self-organizing life aim” which provides meaning 
(McKnight & Kashdan, 2009, p. 242). Purpose allows individuals to situate 
themselves in broader social contexts (Bronk, 2011) and to imagine their ideal future 
selves. Further, purpose is related to many positive outcomes, including the inhibition 
of impulsivity (Burrow & Spreng, 2016), increased life satisfaction across the lifespan 
(Bronk, Hill, Lapsley, Talib, & Finch, 2009), and the promotion of greater consistency 
of the self across time (Burrow, Sumner, & Ong, 2014b).  
While dispositional purpose in life has many positive correlates, it is important 
to note that such outcomes can be achieved through purpose interventions as well. For 
instance, in one study researchers asked individuals to write about their sense of 
purpose in life and found that these individuals, compared to those who wrote about a 
control topic, were more comfortable when confronting diversity (Burrow, Stanley, 
 47 
Sumner, & Hill, 2014a). Further, writing about one’s sense of purpose has also been 
shown to decrease antisocial behaviors in impoverished adolescents (Machell, 
Disabato, & Kashdan, 2016) and to increase confidence in mock legal investigators 
(Burd, Burrow, Torrie, & Nam, 2016a). 
 Self-affirmation 
Individuals may experience a host of threats, ranging from threats to their 
identity (e.g., Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004), stress relating to identity 
threat and academics (e.g., G. L. Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006) or in response 
to stressful social experiences (e.g., Fogelman & Canli, 2015). In the face of these 
threats, individuals seek to maintain a positive self-concept and are motivated to 
protect their sense of self-worth and integrity (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 
1988). Individuals may respond directly or indirectly, and sometimes in a defensive, 
unproductive manner (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, self-affirmation can help 
individuals cope with such threats. Evidence shows that affirming the self in a context 
unrelated to the threat reminds people of who they are (Sherman & Cohen, 2006) by 
drawing on alternative resources of self-worth (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; 
Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Thus, self-affirmation is implicated in many positive 
outcomes. For instance, self-affirmation interventions can help reduce individuals’ 
implicit racial biases: One study suggests that self-affirmation leads to lower race IAT 
scores (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004). Further, research suggests that 
morality salience (an increased awareness of one’s own mortality) can also be reduced 
through self-affirmation (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). This research may have 
important implications for legal decision makers and actors. Police officers may 
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experience mortality salience in their daily lives, and this may reduce their acceptance 
of out-group members; however, self-affirmation may mitigate these effects. 
Purpose in Life and Self-affirmation: Protection from Threat 
 Given that purpose in life and self-affirmation can help reduce individuals’ 
reactions to and promote recovery from stressful (e.g., Fogelman & Canli, 2015; 
Schaefer et al., 2013) or threatening events, and can even prevent perceptions of stress 
(D. K. Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009), both might serve as helpful 
interventions to law enforcement officers by mitigating racial biases, which may relate 
to shooting decisions. Purpose helps buffer against negative affect during times of 
uncertainty, discomfort, or change (e.g., Burrow et al., 2014a), and is generally related 
to increased well-being (e.g., Burrow et al., 2014b). Self-affirmation increases 
individuals’ perceptions of their self resources, which in turn is associated with lower 
stress appraisal (Creswell, Welch, Taylor, D. K. Sherman, Gruenewald, & Mann, 
2005). Further, self-affirmation can facilitate self-regulation (Loseman & van den Bos, 
2012) and promote self-control when one is cognitively depleted (Schmeichel & Vohs, 
2009). Taken together, purpose in life and self-affirmation may reduce officers’ 
perceptions of threat, which in turn, may increase shooting decision accuracy. 
Study Overview 
Given the many positive effects of purpose in life and self-affirmation, police 
decision accuracy may be improved through targeted interventions of these constructs. 
Both purpose in life and self-affirmation may reduce officers’ perceptions of threat 
related to implicit racial biases, which in turn may increase their decision accuracy 
during ambiguous situations. The aim of the current study was to explore the impact of 
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purpose in life and self-affirmation writing interventions on shooting decision 
accuracy and decision reaction time in a first-person shooting video game task, 
wherein participants were asked to make active decisions to shoot or not to shoot 
target photos containing European and African American “suspects” holding either 
weapons or harmless objects. Participants were tasked with “shooting” armed suspects 
and choosing not to shoot unarmed suspects. 
A secondary aim was to explore any differences that might exist in the efficacy 
of purpose in life and self-affirmation writing interventions. While the purpose in life 
and self-affirmation literature suggests that both confer many positive benefits in those 
who cultivate them, less is known about where and for whom these benefits might be 
the greatest (see Burd & Burrow, 2017). 
Research suggests that self-affirmation lowers stress appraisal (Creswell et al., 
2005), promotes self-regulation (Loseman & van den Bos, 2012) and self-control 
(Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009), and reduces implicit racial biases (Frantz et al., 2004), 
while purpose in life is associated with faster recovery from stressful situations (e.g., 
Fogelman & Canli, 2015; Schaefer et al., 2013). Thus, it was hypothesized that self-
affirmation might significantly reduce shooting decision inaccuracies compared to a 
purpose writing intervention or a control task. However, research also suggests that 
purpose in life may increase one’s comfort with diversity and reduce negative affect 
(Burrow et al., 2014a), which in turn may also promote decision accuracy, although 
perhaps not as strongly as self-affirmation interventions. It was also posited that 
purpose in life would protect individuals from the negative affect they may experience 
after making such shooting decisions. Lastly, it was hypothesized that participants in 
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the purpose in life writing condition might respond more slowly than those in the other 
conditions based on research suggesting that purposeful individuals choose to gather 
more evidence than those with lower levels of purpose, which in turn might slow 
reaction time (Burd et al., 2016a).  
Methods 
Participants 
Ninety-six adults (Mage = 20.63, SD = 2.57, Range: 18-35) participated in the 
experiment in exchange for course credit or without compensation. A computer error 
occurred and data from one participant was lost. The sample was nearly balanced in 
gender (51.6% Female, 48.4% Male), yet racially diverse (50.5% European American, 
25.3% Asian / Pacific Islander, 8.4 % African American, 8.4% Hispanic, 7.4% other). 
Manipulations 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions 
(Purpose in Life vs. Self-Affirmation vs. Control). Participants in the Purpose in Life 
intervention condition were asked to write for ten minutes about their sense of purpose 
in life in response to the following prime: 
Please take ten minutes to think about your sense of purpose in life. 
Really reflect on the idea of purpose. When you are ready, please 
describe your sense of purpose (e.g., What is your purpose and where 
did it come from?).  
 
If you do not have a sense of purpose, or are unsure about what it 
might be, please take a few minutes to consider the idea of purpose in 
life and what it would mean for you to have a purpose. Really reflect on 
what it would mean in your life. When you are ready, describe as best 
as you can what you think it would mean to you. 
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Participants in the Self-Affirmation intervention condition first ranked six 
values in order of personal importance (business, art/music/theater, social 
life/relationships, science/pursuit of knowledge, religion/morality, and 
government/politics; e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983), with one being the most personally 
important value. Next, participants wrote for ten minutes about why their selected 
value is important to them using the following prime:  
“Please write for ten minutes about your most important value from 
above. Why is this value most important to you? Why is this value so 
meaningful?” 
 
Participants in the Control condition completed the same values ranking task as 
in the Self-Affirmation condition, but instead wrote about their least important value 
in response to the following prime:  
“Please write for ten minutes about your least important value from 
above. Why might this value be important to others? Why is this value 
so meaningful to others?” 
 
Measures  
Shooting decision accuracy and reaction time. Shooting accuracy was 
operationalized as the ratio of correct decisions to incorrect decisions. A correct 
decision was made when participants chose not to shoot unarmed suspects and chose 
to shoot armed suspects. Participants’ reaction times were recorded for each shooting 
trial.  
Individual difference measures. In the current study, several individual 
differences were measured to explore possible moderators between individuals’ moral 
leanings, Purpose in Life, and implicit racial biases on shooting decisions and shooting 
decision reaction times. 
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Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Participants completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ-30), which measures individual’s reliance on five 
moral foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008). Research indicates that moral 
leanings, as measured by this questionnaire, relate to legal decision making in many 
contexts (e.g., Burd, 2015; Burd et al., 2016a; Burd, Ceci, & Salerno, 2016b). 
Purpose in Life Subscale of the Psychological Wellbeing. This subscale 
measures “a belief that one’s life is purposeful and meaningful” (Ryff & Keyes, 1995, 
p720). Sample items include “I enjoy making plans for the future and working to 
make them a reality,” and “My daily activities often seem trivial and unimportant to 
me,” (reverse-coded), with higher numbers indicating more purpose in life.  
Measures of implicit racial bias and motivation to not be prejudiced. 
Participants completed the Internal and External Motivations to Respond without 
Prejudice Scales (IMS/EMS) (Plant & Devine, 1998). The IMS measures an 
individual’s internal motivation to respond without prejudice based on “self-imposed 
nonprejudiced standards,” while the EMS measures an individual’s external 
motivations to respond without prejudice based on “standards imposed on one by 
significant others” (Plant & Devine, 1998, p 813).  
Additionally, participants responded to the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale 
(CoBRAS) (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000). The CoBRAS is a 20-item 
scale measuring individuals’ beliefs that “race should not and does not matter” 
(Neville et al., 2000, p 60). Individuals with higher scores deny that racism has 
structural components and that racism creates advantages for whites and disadvantages 
minorities. Sample items include “Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated 
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situations” and “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color 
of their skin” (reverse-coded).   
Affect. Participants completed an affect questionnaire containing several items 
from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Participants were asked to indicate how they felt, right now, using a scale 
ranging from 1 (Very slightly to not at all) to 5 (Extremely) for a large variety of 
emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety, calm, disgust, surprised, upset). 
Demographic questionnaire. Participants responded to several demographic 
questions including age, sex, ethnicity, education, and political orientation. 
Procedure 
 Twenty participants (20.83%) completed the experiment across two 
experimental sessions. These individuals completed several individual difference 
measures at Time I (IMS/EMS, CoBRAS), and then completed the first-person shooter 
video game and other dependent measures at Time II. For these individuals, 
participation in the second portion of the experiment occurred on average 11.15 days 
after the first portion. Changes were made to the structure of the experimental sessions 
in order to increase the likelihood that participants would complete all portions of the 
experiment. Thus, all other participants (n = 76; 79.17% of total sample) completed all 
components of the experiment in one experimental session. These individuals first 
completed several individual difference measures (IMS/EMS, CoBRAS). 
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Sample stimuli (Correll et al., 2002) 
Participants were presented with a simple first-person shooter video game that 
randomly presented images of suspects (European American or African American 
men) holding either of two weapons (two different guns) or a harmless object (e.g., 
wallet, cellphone) against various backgrounds (e.g., a mall, a street, a park) (Correll 
et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to shoot at armed suspects and not to shoot at 
unarmed suspects as quickly as possible. Participants were told that they earned points 
for correct decisions and lost points for incorrect decisions, and that the game timed 
out in order to incentivize quick decisions (see Correll et al., 2002). In total, 
participants completed 16 practice and 100 actual trials of the video game. After 
completing all trials, participants completed the above individual difference measures 
for a second time, and additionally answered an affect questionnaire. 
 Results  
Shooting Decision Accuracy 
 A Mixed Factor MANOVA was performed to investigate the impact of writing 
condition, suspect race, and whether suspects were armed on shooting decision 
accuracy, with Subject ID entered as a random factor. Participant responses were 
coded 1 for accurate if they chose to shoot armed suspects and chose not to shoot 
unarmed suspects, while all incorrect responses were coded 0.  
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Figure 1. Mean accuracy for shooting decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Writing condition did not significantly predict shooting decision accuracy, F 
(2, 92) = .25, p = .78. However, analyses revealed main effects of suspect race (F (1, 
276) = 4.17, p = .04) and whether or not suspects were armed, F (1, 276) = 34.79, p < 
.001. Participants were significantly more likely to make accurate decisions for 
African American (M = .73, SE = .01) compared to European American (M = .71, SE 
= .01, p = .04) suspects, and for armed (M = .75, SE = .01) versus unarmed (M = .69, 
SE = .01, p < .001) suspects. No significant interaction was found to exist between 
writing condition and suspect race (F (2, 276) = 1.41, p = .25), and no evidence was 
found for a three-way interaction between writing condition, suspect race, or whether 
the suspect was armed, F (2, 276) = .13, p = .88.  
However, significant interactions were discovered between whether or not 
suspects were armed and writing condition, F (2, 276) = 6.90, p = .001. A series of 
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independent samples t-tests indicated that participants were significantly more 
accurate in their decisions when suspects were armed (M = .76, SD = .13) versus 
unarmed (M = .70, SD = .12) in the control condition, t (126) = 2.83, p = .005. 
Further, participants were more accurate in the self-affirmation condition when 
suspects were armed (M = .76, SD = .11) versus unarmed, M = .66, SD = .16, t (122) 
= 4.16, p < .001). However, participants in the purpose condition did not differ in 
terms of accuracy for armed (M = .73, SD = .19) versus unarmed suspects, M = .72, 
SD = .12, t (126) = .42, p = .67.  
 
Figure 2. Mean accuracy for shooting decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
*p < .01, **p < .001  
 
A significant interaction between whether or not suspects were armed and 
suspect race was also discovered, F (1, 276) = 13.15, p < .001. Analyses further 
revealed that participants were significantly less accurate for decisions regarding 
unarmed (M = .68, SD = .14) versus armed (M = .78, SD = .14) African American 
suspects (t (188) = 4.77, p < .001), while participants did not significantly differ in 
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terms of decision accuracy for unarmed (M = .70, SD = .14) versus armed (M = .72, 
SD = .15) European American suspects, t (188) = 1.07, p = .29.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean accuracy for shooting decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
**p < .001 
 
Shooting Decision Response Time 
 In order to explore the impact of writing condition, suspect race, and whether 
or not the suspect was armed on participants’ shooting reaction time, a series of Mixed 
Factor MANOVAs were performed with Subject ID entered as a random factor.  
 Reaction times for all trials. When looking at participant reaction time for all 
shooting decisions, including inaccuracies, analyses revealed no main effect of writing 
condition (F (2, 92) = 1.17, p = .32) or suspect race, F (1, 276) = 1.47, p = .23. 
However, results suggest a main effect of whether the suspect was armed or unarmed 
(F (1, 276) = 440.94, p < .001), such that decisions regarding armed suspects were 
made significantly faster (M = 522.28 ms, SE = 4.18 ms) compared to unarmed 
suspects (M = 576.59 ms, SE = 4.18 ms). Analyses also revealed a marginally 
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significant interaction between writing condition and suspect race (F (2, 276) = 2.99, p 
= .05), but no significant differences were found for either African American (p  = .21) 
or European American (p = .19) suspects.  
 
Figure 4. Mean response time in milliseconds for all shooting decisions, including 
time-outs and incorrect decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
A significant interaction between writing condition and whether or not the 
suspect was armed was found, F (2, 276) = 7.85, p < .001. Further analyses suggest no 
difference in reaction time for armed suspects (p  = .16), but indicated that, for 
unarmed suspects, reaction times were significantly faster for participants in the 
purpose condition (M = 563.34 ms, SD = 42.77) compared to those in both the control 
(M = 583.60 ms, SD = 40.90, p = .03) and self-affirmation conditions, M = 582.83 ms, 
SD = 51.92, p = .04. 
450 
470 
490 
510 
530 
550 
570 
590 
610 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
A
rm
ed
 
U
na
rm
ed
 
AA EA AA EA AA EA 
Control Self-affirmation Purpose 
 59 
 
Figure 5. Mean response time in milliseconds for all shooting decisions, including 
time-outs and incorrect decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < .05 
 
Further, analyses revealed a significant interaction between suspect race and 
whether the suspect was armed, F (1, 276) = 24.33, p < .001. While no significant 
differences were found for armed suspects (p = .13), reaction times were significantly 
faster for unarmed European American suspects (M = 568.63 ms, SD = 43.34) 
compared to unarmed African American Suspects (M = 584.42 ms, SD = 47.65, t 
(188) = 2.39, p = .02). Lastly, no significant 3-way interaction was discovered 
between writing condition, suspect race, and whether or not the suspect was armed, F 
(2, 276) = .01, p = .99.  
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Figure 6. Mean response time in milliseconds for all shooting decisions, including 
time-outs and incorrect decisions. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < .05 
 
Reaction times for accurate trials. When looking at participant reaction time 
specifically for accurate decisions, analyses revealed a marginal main effect of writing 
condition, F (2, 90.62) = 3.09, p = .05.  Participants in the purpose writing condition 
made decisions significantly faster (M = 501.08 ms, SE = 3.91 ms) than those in the 
control condition (M = 514.77 ms, SE = 3.91 ms, p = .05), while no differences were 
found for those in the control versus self-affirmation (p = .47), or self-affirmation 
versus purpose (p = .92). Reaction time was not significantly predicted by suspect 
race, F (1, 7836.91) = 3.15, p = .08.  
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Figure 7. Mean response time in milliseconds for accurate shooting decisions. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean response time in milliseconds for accurate shooting decisions. Error 
bars represent standard errors. *p = .05 
 
However, reaction time significantly varied by whether the suspect was armed 
or unarmed (F (1, 7858.65) = 866.70, p < .001), such that decisions regarding armed 
suspects were made significantly faster (M = 486.92 ms, SE = 2.37 ms) compared to 
unarmed suspects, M = 528.19 ms, SE = 2.38 ms, p  < .001. No significant interaction 
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was found between writing condition and suspect race (F (2, 7836.92) = .70, p = .50), 
or writing condition and whether suspects were armed, F (2, 7858.3) = .97, p = .38.  
Analyses revealed a significant interaction between suspect race and whether 
suspects were armed, F (1, 7837.61) = 8.51, p = .004. While no significant differences 
were found for armed African American suspects (M = 486.32 ms, SD = 68.06 ms) 
versus armed European American suspects (M = 488.05 ms, SD = 67.53 ms, t (4124) = 
-.82, p = .41), reaction times were significantly faster for unarmed European American 
suspects (M = 524.29 ms, SD = 63.91) compared to unarmed African American 
suspects, M = 530.62 ms, SD = 60.83, t (3809) = 3.13, p = .002. Lastly, no significant 
three-way interaction was discovered between writing condition, suspect race, and 
whether or not the suspect was armed, F (2, 7837.60) = .37, p = .69.  
 
Figure 9. Mean response time in milliseconds for accurate shooting decisions. Error 
bars represent standard errors. *p < .01 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Response decision. Although participants typically made a shooting decision, 
in 13.7% of the shooting video game trials, no decision was made. A series of analyses 
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were conducted to explore the factors impacting participants’ shooting responses and 
non-responses. Chi-square analyses revealed that participants’ likelihood of making a 
decision did not vary by suspect race (χ2 = 1.59, p = .21), or by writing condition, χ2 = 
1.77, p = .41. However, participants’ likelihood of responding was impacted by 
whether or not the suspect was armed, χ2 = 120.45, p < .001.  
 
Figure 10. Mean decision. Error bars represent standard errors. 
First, all non-responses were coded 0 while responses were coded 1. Then, an 
average was created for each individual. A Mixed Factor MANOVA was performed 
with Subject ID entered as a random factor. Analyses revealed no main effect of 
writing condition (F (2, 92) = .17, p = .85) or race, F (1, 276) = 1.30, p = .26. A main 
effect was found for whether suspects were armed (F (1, 276) = 108.18, p < .001), 
which indicated that participants were significantly less likely to respond when 
suspects were unarmed (M = .83, SE = .01) compared to armed, M = .90, SE = .01, p 
< .001. 
No interaction was indicated between writing condition and race, F (2, 276) = 
2.34, p = 10. However, analyses revealed a significant interaction between writing 
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condition and whether suspects were armed, F (2, 276) = 9.42, p < .001. A series of 
independent samples t-tests indicated that participants were significantly more likely 
to respond when participants were armed (M = .90, SD = .08) versus unarmed (M = 
.82, SD = .10) in the control (t (126) = 4.92, p < .001), and in the self-affirmation 
condition when suspects were armed (M = .92, SD = .05) versus unarmed, M = .81, 
SD = .11, t (122) = 6.85, p < .001. However, participants in the purpose condition 
were no more or less likely to respond to armed (M = .89, SD = .12) or unarmed 
suspects, M = .85, SD = .09, t (126) = 1.79, p = .08. 
 Further, analyses revealed a significant interaction between suspect race and 
whether the suspect was armed, F (1, 276) = 15.61, p < .001. While no significant 
differences were found for armed suspects (p = .12), participants were significantly 
less likely to make a decision for unarmed African American suspects (M = .81, SD = 
.11) compared to unarmed European American suspects, M = .84, SD = .10, t (188) = -
2.41, p = .02. Lastly, no significant 3-way interaction was discovered between writing 
condition, suspect race, and whether or not the suspect was armed, F (2, 276) = .15, p 
= .86. 
Linguistic analyses. Exploratory analyses were conducted utilizing linguistic 
analyses software (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & 
Francis, 2015) to investigate the content of participants’ writing responses to the 
writing condition prompts (Control vs. Self-affirmation vs. Purpose). Exploring 
differences in participants’ writing in response to these prompts may help uncover any 
differences or similarities in the impact of these two interventions on shooting 
decisions.  
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Language Use by Condition 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Numbers within a row that do not share a 
subscript are significantly different from one another at p < .05.  
 
Analyses revealed participants’ responses were significantly shorter in the 
purpose compared to control and self-affirmation writing condition. Further, clout was 
significantly higher in the self-affirmation versus control conditions: Higher numbers 
in this category reflect high expertise and confidence in perspective. In addition, 
authenticity was higher in the self-affirmation and purpose conditions compared to 
control, with higher numbers reflecting more personal and honest responses. Words 
reflecting social processes (e.g., family, friends) were significantly higher in the self-
affirmation compared to control condition. Causal references were higher in both the 
purpose and self-affirmation conditions compared to the control. Lastly, words 
referencing drives (e.g., affiliations, achievement, power) were significantly higher in 
the purpose and self-affirmation conditions compared to the control. 
 Measures of implicit biases. Exploratory analyses were conducted to 
investigate whether pre- and post-test measures of implicit racial biases significantly 
differed by writing intervention. However, pre- and post-test scores did not vary 
across time for Colorblind Racial Attitudes (p = .61), and there was no interaction 
between Colorblind Racial Attitudes and writing condition (p = .60). Further, internal 
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motivation not to be prejudiced did not vary across time (p = .40), and there was no 
interaction between internal motivation not to be prejudiced and writing condition, p = 
.99. Lastly, no evidence was found for a change in external motivation not to be 
prejudiced (p = .52), and no indication of a significant interaction between external 
motivation not to be prejudiced and writing condition, p = .12. 
Discussion 
 The current study investigated novel interventions aimed at reducing 
inaccurate shooting decisions. The current study provides some evidence to suggest 
that a purpose writing intervention might serve as an “equalizer” in terms of shooting 
decision accuracy, and that purpose might serve as a useful intervention to reduce 
shooting decision response times. Decision accuracy was greater for armed suspects 
compared to unarmed suspects in both the control and self-affirmation conditions. 
However, participants within the purpose writing condition were equally accurate for 
armed and unarmed suspects. Unfortunately, evidence was found suggesting that 
shooting decision accuracy was reduced for unarmed versus armed African American 
suspects. However, decision accuracy did not vary for armed or unarmed European 
American suspects. These findings are in line with other similar research finding that 
unarmed African American suspects are mistakenly shot more than unarmed European 
American suspects (e.g., Correll et al, 2002, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2003). In 
addition, research suggests police officers are more likely to use force against male 
minority suspects compared to other groups (Bolger, 2015).   
 In addition, the current study provides some evidence suggesting purpose in 
life writing interventions may reduce shooting decision reaction times. When 
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examining all shooting decisions (accurate and inaccurate), participants who wrote 
about their sense of purpose in life before engaging in the shooting task made 
significantly faster decisions for unarmed suspects compared to participants who 
engaged in a self-affirmation or control writing task. This result is somewhat 
surprising given literature examining the relationship between purpose in life and 
stress: Research in this area generally suggests that purpose in life speeds up one’s 
recovery from stressful situations (e.g., Fogelman & Canli, 2015; Schaefer et al., 
2013), but not one’s reactivity to stressful situations (e.g., Fogelman & Canli, 2015). 
Perhaps reaction to and recovery from the stress of engaging in these shooting 
paradigms is so brief that purpose promotes such fast recovery from the stressful 
stimuli and decision to shoot armed and unarmed suspects, that individuals prompted 
to consider their purpose in life actually experience a brief recovery from stress and 
thus are able to make faster, more accurate decisions compared to those who complete 
a self-affirmation or control writing task. Ishida and Okada (2006) found that 
purposeful individuals experienced less anxiety, psychiatric and somatic symptoms, 
and less sympathetic nervous system activation in response to anxiety and fear-
provoking stimuli compared to less purposeful individuals. Further, purposeful 
individuals experienced greater parasympathetic nervous system activation in response 
to stressful stimuli compared to those with less purpose. These data suggest that 
purpose might buffer individuals’ reactivity to and recovery from stressful situations.    
 Further examination of participants’ reaction times for accurate shooting 
decisions suggests that purpose again serves as a resource during these trying times: 
Participants in the purpose writing conditions responded to targets accurately, 
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significantly faster than those in the control condition. While other research suggests 
that self-affirmation may buffer against the negative impact of stressors (e.g., D. K. 
Sherman et al., 2009), less research suggests that purpose reduces reactivity to 
stressors. However, some research suggests a powerful mitigating effect of purpose in 
life inductions in response to threat from diversity (e.g., Burrow et al., 2014a). 
Importantly, the current study replicated prior research finding that reaction times for 
accurate shooting decisions vary as a function of suspect race: Participants generally 
responded faster during shooting decisions regarding unarmed European American 
versus unarmed African American suspects (see Correll et al., 2002, 2006).  
 Examining shooting decisions another way, the current study provides 
evidence to suggest that individuals are generally more hesitant when suspects are 
unarmed versus armed. For instance, participants across all conditions were more 
likely to timeout on trials involving unarmed compared to armed suspects. However, 
the discrepancy between responses to armed and unarmed targets was considerable for 
those in the self-affirmation and control writing conditions, while no difference in 
responsiveness was found for those in the purpose writing conditions. 
 Related research suggests that “shooter bias” is less pronounced in individuals 
with high cognitive control (Payne, 2005), and Correll and colleagues (2006) argue 
that the key to reducing improper shootings, even amongst those with implicit or 
explicit racial biases, is response inhibition. In the current study, purpose may have 
won out over self-affirmation as an intervention because purpose has been implicated 
in reducing anxiety associated with thoughts of one’s death (Routledge & Juhl, 2010), 
promoting positive reappraisal during times of stress (Hilton, 1989), and reducing 
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anxiety while promoting parasympathetic nervous system activation (Ishida & Okada, 
2006). In one study exploring the relationship between mortality salience, purpose and 
meaning, and death anxiety (Routledge & Juhl, 2010), researchers found that 
individuals with lower levels of purpose experienced heightened anxiety about death 
following tasks where they were asked to imagine their own deaths: However, there 
was no significant effect of mortality salience on anxiety for purposeful individuals, 
and in fact, purposeful individuals experienced increased positive affect. Further, 
Hilton (1989) found that purposeful individuals were more likely to use positive 
reappraisal and less likely to use escape-avoidance strategies when dealing with stress 
related to cancer diagnoses.     
 In the current study, exploratory linguistic analyses did not prove fruitful. 
While some significant differences were found between the control, purpose in life, 
and self-affirmation writing conditions, most findings were not particularly 
enlightening. However, future research should delve further into this exploration 
utilizing hand coding or though the creation of a custom dictionary in LIWC. In 
addition, neither purpose in life nor the self-affirmation writing prompts produced 
changes in implicit racial biases across time. Future research should utilize additional 
measures of racial biases and cultural stereotypes.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current research, while promising, is not without limitations. For instance, 
the current experiment was underpowered: Power analyses suggest that a minimum of 
126 individuals would be required to reliably detect differences amongst these writing 
interventions with an effect size of .2 or more and to fully explore all two-way 
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interactions within this model. However, 96 individuals completed all portions of the 
experimental paradigm (76.19% of the total required sample), and the data from one 
participant was lost (final sample = 75.40% of the total required sample).  
In addition to low sample size, it cannot be determined if some hypotheses 
were not confirmed regarding the writing interventions because such effects are truly 
not present, or if the lack of findings is due to artifacts of the sample. Previous 
research suggests that police officers with four-year degrees are less likely to make 
improper shooting decisions than those without such education (McElvain & 
Kposowa, 2000). Further, “shooter bias” is dampened in samples that have lower 
levels, compared to higher levels, of negative cultural stereotypes regarding African 
Americans (Correll et al., 2002, 2006).    
The current research is but an initial test of interventions aimed at reducing 
improper shooting decisions in police officers: Many factors contribute to police 
decisions to shoot, and the contexts of these decisions vary considerably. Other 
factors, including context ambiguity, must be explored. Future research should 
examine whether these interventions increase the processing of information during 
shooting decisions using eye-tracking technology.  
In addition, future research should explore the duration of these effects. For 
instance, after priming an individual with purpose or affirmation, how long will 
improvements in these decisions? Further, how often must these interventions be used 
to maintain high levels of decision accuracy? Research should explore the strength and 
duration of these effects and could investigate whether such interventions have other 
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positive downstream effects (e.g., overall decreases in stress, improvement in self-
esteem, etc.) that might have a recursive effect on police shooting decisions. 
Conclusions 
 The aim of the current line of research is to determine the feasibility of 
utilizing self-affirmation and sense of purpose interventions to increase accuracy in 
police shooting decisions. Importantly, this work illustrates that a purpose writing 
intervention might improve decision accuracy without sacrificing fast reaction times.  
These findings have important implications for public policy and police officer 
training. Purpose interventions would be relatively low-cost to institute in police 
departments, which is an important consideration for communities as they try to 
determine how to best address issues surrounding improper shootings. Training for 
these departments would be minimal, which may increase the likelihood of 
departmental participation in such training endeavors. 
Generally, there are noticeable gaps in our current knowledge surrounding self-
affirmation and purpose in life, and how they might apply to legal decision making. 
We do not fully understand the mechanisms by which these constructs benefit us, or 
how they differ in terms of the processes by which they help us to reap such benefits. 
Such interventions are not always sufficient to impact human behavior (e.g., Vohs, 
Park, & Schmeichel, 2013). More research is needed to determine the link between 
one’s intentions and their ability or willingness to act on such intentions. Overall, the 
current study provides initial promising evidence that purpose in life should be 
investigated as a possible intervention aimed at reducing improper shooting decisions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DIVERGING DECISIONS: A COMPARISON OF JURY VERDICT PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Courts with greater mistrust of jurors often structure juries’ decision making more so 
than courts with more inherent trust in jurors and their determinations. For instance, 
criminal courts in the United States most often utilize general verdicts, where jurors 
freely deliberate about the evidence and come to an independent verdict. However, 
several court systems abroad have begun to require reasons accompany jury verdicts 
in the hopes that a reasoning requirement will reduce bias and arbitrary decision 
making. Importantly, no known empirical research has explored the impact of a 
reasoning requirement on juror decision making in comparison to other verdict 
procedures (e.g., general or special verdicts). The current study explores the impact of 
verdict procedures on mock juror decision making in a civil case. Results indicate that 
mock jurors were significantly more likely to find for the defendant when utilizing 
special verdict procedures, while mock juror verdicts were similar across all other 
verdict procedures. Further, mock jurors’ overall perceptions of the plaintiff and 
defendants’ cases predicted verdict, over and above general perceptions of the plaintiff 
and defendant. The legal implications of these results for verdict procedures are 
discussed.  
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DIVERGING DECISIONS: A COMPARISON OF JURY VERDICT PROCEDURES 
 
Jurors are tasked with remembering, integrating, and utilizing large amounts of 
complex evidence. Dan Simon (2004) states: 
Most legal cases that are litigated and appealed are [complex], in that the facts 
can be ambiguous, incomplete, and contradictory; different rules, values, and 
principles can be invoked to support opposite conclusions; and the case at hand 
can be somewhat analogous to more than one previous decision. On their face, 
such tasks might seem intractable. (p. 516) 
The above account draws attention to just how difficult it can be for jurors to reach a 
verdict during trial. 
Legal and psycholegal scholars have long questioned how jurors make 
decisions, what probative and non-probative factors might impact their decisions, and 
what can be done to improve juror decision making accuracy. Many theories of 
reasoning describe the complexities of the decision making process generally (for a 
review, see Osman, 2004), with some paying special attention to decision making in 
the context of juries (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 1992).  
The courts aim to promote strong decision making in jurors, and some jury 
systems have adopted verdict procedures that aim to reduce arbitrary decision making 
and facilitate review, particularly on appeal (Thaman, 2011). In particular, systems 
that appear to have a general mistrust of jurors seem especially keen on scaffolding 
jurors’ decision making (Marder & Hans, 2015), despite the fact that such procedures 
undermine jury independence (Burd & Hans, in press). To this end, several countries 
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have begun to require that jurors provide substantiated reasons in support of their 
verdict decisions (Burd & Hans, in press; Thaman, 2002; 2011). 
Given the general complexity of the tasks jurors face, it is clear why some 
courts aim to assist jurors by requiring reasons for their verdicts, and why some 
believe that requiring jurors to provide reasons might help to reduce bias and improve 
decision making. However, psychological theory suggests there is good reason to 
suspect that requiring jurors to produce reasons for their decisions after they have 
already rendered a verdict is not likely to promote stronger decision making, or 
improve decision accuracy. For instance, related work suggests that individuals are 
often unaware of and unable to report their cognitive processes, and when they are 
asked to do so, may not be able to report why they have made a decision, or how their 
attitudes might have impacted their decision (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Importantly, although several countries in Europe require reasons for jurors’ verdicts 
(e.g., Csere, 2012; Thaman, 2007, 2011), no known empirical research has explored 
these issues. 
 In the current study, mock juror decision making was compared across four 
verdict procedure contexts: general verdicts (a verdict in which a jury reaches a legal 
conclusion, such as whether a person is liable or not), special verdicts (a verdict in 
which a jury reaches a factual rather than legal conclusion), and two different 
variations of a procedure wherein jurors gave a general verdict but were required to 
provide reasons for their verdicts. The aim of the current study was to investigate 
which verdict procedure, if any, might produce the strongest verdict decisions (i.e., 
most in line with the probative evidence). In addition, this research explored whether 
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certain reasoning requirements might mitigate the impact of racial biases on juror 
decision making. While many sources of biases might influence jurors’ decisions, the 
current study addresses the impact of racial bias in the current study given the 
prominence of racial inequalities in the justice system (e.g., Hetey & Eberhardt, in 
press; Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, & Spohn, 2014; Voigt et al., 2017). 
Reasoned Verdicts 
 Many countries are turning to the use of reasoned verdicts, including countries 
with classic jury systems (e.g., Russia and Spain) (e.g., Csere, 2012; Thaman, 2007, 
2011) and those with mixed courts (e.g., France and Italy) (Cohen, 2016; Hans & 
Jolivet, 2016). In classic juries, jurors typically deliberate freely without much 
external influence. In contrast, in mixed courts, professional and lay judges deliberate 
together. It is important to discuss some of the variations in these reasoned verdict 
procedures in order to get a clear view of why some courts favor them so strongly, and 
to explore why, contrary to popular belief, they may not actually lead to stronger jury 
decisions.     
Spain provides one contemporary classic jury model that utilizes reasoned 
verdicts. In Spain, jurors do not deliberate freely before rendering a verdict: Instead, 
the judge provides jurors with a series of “yes” and “no” questions regarding the facts 
of the case, the charges, and possible defenses, along with a summary of the case from 
the judge (Thaman, 2011). Jurors are meant to deliberate on and take a vote for each 
of the questions posed to them (Thaman, 2011). For each question, they must then 
provide concise reasons for why they found each fact to be proved or not proved, and 
to detail which evidence they relied upon in make their decision (Ley Orgánica de 22 
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de Mayo, 1995; Thaman, 1997). The jury also provides a general vote of “guilty” or 
“not guilty” (Thaman, 2011). Interestingly, jurors vote on each question, and verdicts 
are decided by majority rule (Jimeno-Bulnes, 2007, 2011). 
Importantly, the judge reviews all responses to verify the reasons provided are 
sufficient, and can rule that the reasons provided were insufficient or contained errors 
(Thaman, 2011). However, the standard by which judges review reasons for 
sufficiency are not standardized, and range from the “minimalist approach” (judges 
assess the reasons provided and will accept general references to case evidence 
without a detailed account) to the “maximalist approach” (wherein jurors are required 
to provide in-depth, substantiated reasons, including a full account of their decision 
making process and which facts they believed were or were not proven) (Thaman, 
2011). Importantly, if the judge deems that the verdict was not accompanied by 
sufficient reasoning, he/she can return the verdict form to the jury for correction; 
however, there is no requirement that the judge do so, and in either case, this grants 
the judge a large level of control over the jury’s verdicts (Thaman, 2011). 
Belgium, too, has a reasoning requirement for verdicts. Similarly to Spain, 
judges draft a question list for jurors, who deliberate independently of the judges, 
reach a verdict, and must answers the questions provided. The jury then discusses the 
verdict with a panel of three judges, who help the jury to draft their reasons. If the 
panel determines that the jury did not properly apply the law, or erred in the reasons 
they provided, their judgment may be set aside (Thaman, 2011).  
Like Spain and Belgium, Austria requires the jury to provide reasons for their 
verdicts, but jurors do not receive any assistance when drafting the reasons for their 
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judgment (Taylor, 2011). In Austria, too, the jury may be asked to correct its verdict 
forms if the judges deem it to be incomplete or contains any contradictions (Taylor, 
2011).     
 Italy and France utilize mixed courts where lay and professional judges 
deliberate together and collectively provide reasons to question lists (Hans & Jolivet, 
2016; Malsch, 2016). In Italy and France, each judge (professional and lay) must vote 
on every question, secretly in France but not in Italy (Hans & Jolivet, 2016). Further, 
in both Italy and France, professional judges draft the reasons for the verdict (Hans & 
Jolivet, 2016).  
General and Special Verdicts in the U. S. 
 In the U.S., most criminal trials utilize general verdicts. Here, jurors listen to 
the trial evidence, receive judicial instructions, and then retire to deliberate on the 
evidence, privately. The deliberation process is quite independent, with few procedural 
guidelines. Jurors may deliberate until they reach a decision, which must be 
unanimous in most cases. No reasons are required of the jury, and thus, little is usually 
known about the deliberation process or how jurors arrived at a decision.  
 General verdicts can also be utilized in civil courts in the U.S., and general 
verdicts with answers to written questions are also permitted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 49). In 
these cases, a general verdict is rendered, but then jurors must also answer a series of 
factual questions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(1)). General verdicts with answers to written 
questions can also be employed in criminal cases: Here, questions might be posed to 
jurors when they are asked to assess a defense, or, in a case when a defendant has 
received multiple charges, which ground the jury will convict on (Nepveu, 2003). 
 88 
Further, questions can be used during sentencing to decide facts regarding aggravating 
or mitigating circumstances, or to assess jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s 
dangerousness (Nepveu, 2003).  
 Special verdicts in the U. S. share some similarity to reasoned verdicts utilized 
abroad. The jury is asked to answer factual questions pertaining to the case, and the 
judge ultimately renders a verdict based on the jury’s responses to the written 
questions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 49). Special verdicts are meant to help jurors identify and 
organize key pieces of information during trial (Casper, 1993). In addition, special 
verdicts might help jurors by limiting the effect of confusing judicial instructions 
(Stephens, 1987). Importantly, special verdicts are not used in criminal cases within 
the U. S., as some argue that leaving the ultimate decision to the judge would violate 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to have a jury of peers make the ultimate 
determination (Nepveu, 2003, citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 
(1995); U.S. Const. amend. VI).  
Comparing Verdict Procedures 
 As noted above, several countries have adopted reasoned verdict procedures on 
the assumption that such verdicts will promote strong jury decision making, increase 
transparency in the decision making process, and increase reviewability for judges, or 
for defendants on appeal. However, no known empirical research has informed this 
debate. When juries utilize reasoned verdict, special verdict, or general verdict with 
answers to written questions procedures, these tasks require that the jury answers a, 
sometimes long, series of questions before providing reasons for their responses. 
When utilizing either reasoned verdicts or general verdicts with answers to written 
 89 
questions, jurors may make a holistic determination of liability, and then answer the 
fact-based questions. If this is the case, then jurors might be answering the factual 
questions in a way that they feel aligns with their verdict in a post hoc manner, rather 
than making a determination of guilt based on their answers to the written questions in 
criminal cases. 
Examining Reasoned, Special, and General Verdicts through a Psychological 
Lens 
 Although no known empirical research has investigated the impact of reasoned 
verdict procedures on juror decision making, much related decision making research 
suggests that reasoned verdicts may not actually promote decision making more in line 
with the evidence. One of the strongest pushes for reasoned verdicts is based on the 
belief that requiring reasons of jurors will reduce ambiguity and bias in their decision 
making to promote verdict accuracy. For instance, the reasoning requirement might, at 
a minimum, compel jurors to think carefully about their decisions (Jimeno-Bulnes, 
2007). Further, some positive experiences with reasoned verdicts in Spain suggest that 
the reasoning requirement might promote jurors to think carefully about the evidence 
and to compare it to the defendant’s version of events (e.g., a defendant claiming a 
stabbing was an accident, versus the alternative possibility, that the stabbing was 
intentional) (Thaman, 1997).  
Those in favor of general verdicts argue that free deliberation is inherently 
filled with debate as jurors discuss key issues to come to a unanimous decision 
(Abramson, 2015). Further, some legal commentators argue that general verdicts are 
based on evidence, and that jury verdicts are already very clear (Lempert, 2007, 2015).  
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Proponents of special verdicts argue that these procedures help jurors to 
identify key facts within a case and discourage jurors from taking a holistic approach 
to their decision making (Henderson, Bertram, & Toke, 1995). By asking jurors to 
answer factual questions, independently of other questions, special verdicts might 
make it less likely that jurors tailor their responses to the questions based on their 
desired out come of the case (Henderson et al., 1995). Clermont (2018) argues that 
jurors should not, and do not, consider an overall question, even in cases with multiple 
elements, as jurors are tasked with applying a standard of proof to each element. 
Casper (1993) suggests that special verdicts might help to increase juror 
comprehension of evidence and organize testimony and legal rules.  
Below, relevant psychological and jury research is examined to explore how 
jurors might reason and make decisions across these various verdict contexts. Several 
models of decision making and reasoning, detailed below, suggest that the reasoning 
requirement may not improve decision accuracy compared to other verdict procedures. 
Dual-process Models 
 Dual-process models suggest that humans reason using two separate systems 
when reasoning, working in parallel, which may be in conflict with one another. 
System I is a fast, intuitive processor of information, while System II is a slower, more 
deliberative system. System I’s effortless and intuitive responses may lead to errors, 
but System II can catch, and sometimes override these improper intuitions. System I is 
more likely to win out over System II during novel or highly complex situations, and 
at these times, humans are more susceptible to making errors, which System II may 
not catch (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
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 These parallel processors are highly relevant to the context of jury decision 
making, particularly in trials with complex and novel information that jurors must sift 
through and integrate as they make their decisions. In these situations, System I might 
be more likely to be activated and to win out over System II. If jurors anticipate 
having to provide reasons for their judgments, then System II might be activated. This 
would be particularly helpful if System II is initiated as jurors are hearing testimony 
and evidence, as it might increase their objectivity. However, no known previous 
research has empirically investigated whether a reasoning requirement actually 
increases jurors’ reliance on System II processing.  
The Story Model of Jury Decision Making 
 The story model of juror decision making is considered one of the most 
accurate accounts of how jurors make decisions when determining guilt using a 
general verdict (Levett & Devine, 2017; Vidmar & Hans, 2007). The story model 
suggests that as jurors listen to testimony and evidence at trial, they begin to form a 
narrative that they feel best describes what they are hearing (Pennington & Hastie, 
1986, 1988, 1992, 1993). In the process of deliberation, the story model suggests that 
jurors discuss and analyze their narratives with one another, and then, through group 
discussions, create or decide on a narrative that is the best fit for the evidence 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Then, when making a determination of guilt, they 
compare their narrative to the verdict category options and choose the verdict that 
most aligns with their conception of the trial narrative and which best accounts for the 
case facts (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
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 Research regarding the story model suggests that jurors might make decisions 
most in line with the evidence, and with more confidence, when allowed to structure 
the evidence according to a narrative and to deliberate freely (Pennington & Hastie, 
1992). In one study, researchers found that mock jurors made stronger decisions (more 
in line with the evidence) when evidence was presented in narrative form, rather than 
by legal issue (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Item-by-item evidence presentation is 
somewhat similar to reasoned and special verdicts, and in the current study, made 
mock jurors less confident in their judgments and caused them to use less explanation-
based reasoning (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Generally, research regarding the story 
model suggests that, without prompting, mock jurors engage in deep deliberative 
reasoning, make inferences, use analogy, and compare alternatives (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993).  
Moral Reasoning 
 In line with some dual-process models, the Social Intuitionist Model proposes 
that deliberative reasoning often loses out to intuitive judgments. Haidt (2001) 
suggests that when individuals are confronted with moral stimuli, they immediately 
form a fast, intuitive, gut-based judgment about the situation, assess their gut reaction 
to determine their value judgment about the stimuli (ie: good or bad), and only after, 
and only sometimes, reason about the moral stimuli. In this model, moral emotions, 
like anger and disgust, are direct causes of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001). Haidt 
(2001) argues that individuals may never begin to reason about their moral judgments, 
and usually only do so when their judgments are called into question as a way to 
explain, justify, or understand them. In certain situations, individuals may reason 
 93 
about a moral stimulus, but Haidt argues that this is exceedingly rare, and usually only 
occurs when there is a weak initial intuition (Haidt, 2001).  
 In one study, Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, Björklund & Murphy, 2000) 
demonstrated that individuals typically make fast, intuitive judgments, and often 
struggle when asked to provide reasons for such judgments: Participants read several 
stories depicting acts that seemed intuitively immoral. Experimenters then asked 
participants to determine whether the acts were moral or immoral, and why. 
Participants were often dumbfounded, and could typically not explain why the 
seemingly immoral, but not harmful, acts were in fact wrong (Haidt et al., 2000). This 
study illustrates how judgments are often developed post hoc, after a strong moral 
intuition has already taken hold.  
fMRI research also lends support to the idea that moral stimuli can invoke 
strong emotional reactions that are not necessarily accompanied by strong non-
emotional processing. Across two studies, researchers found that participants 
presented with personal moral dilemmas (e.g., asked about the appropriateness of the 
footbridge problem, a variation of the trolley problem, wherein participants are asked 
whether it would be appropriate to push a large man onto the track to prevent the 
deaths of five other individuals) experienced increased activation in parts of the brain 
associated with emotional processing compared to participants asked about impersonal 
moral dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001). Further, participants’ activation of areas of the brain implicated in 
working memory were less active in these personal-moral dilemmas, and such areas of 
the brain have been shown to be less active during emotional processing (Greene et 
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al., 2001). In the current studies, these effects were reversed for impersonal moral 
dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). 
 This body of work is very relevant to the reasoned verdict debate as it 
illustrates an illusion of objectivity: Reasons generated post hoc certainly may seem 
objective, but importantly, when they follow a judgment they may not be easily 
changed and can be based on little objective evidence. Haidt argues that individuals 
are rarely able to override their initial judgments, but that it is possible if one tries to 
take another perspective, which could in turn trigger a new intuition (Haidt, 2001). In 
relation to the reasoning requirement debate, this suggests that asking jurors to provide 
reason may just spark post-hoc justifications for intuitive, but not deliberatively 
reasoned judgments. However, if jurors are aware in advance that they will be required 
to provide reasons and are also exposed to different perspectives during deliberation, 
they may be able to counteract any incorrect, intuitive judgments.  
Predecisional Distortion and Motivated Reasoning 
 Research regarding predecisional distortion and motivated reasoning suggest 
that a reasoning requirement may not ensure stronger juror decisions compared to 
general verdicts. Predecisional distortion occurs when individuals distort new 
incoming information to fit with a preexisting belief or preference (Russo, Meloy, & 
Medvec, 1998). Further, research suggests that predecisional distortion is more likely 
to occur when the incoming information is ambiguous and could be interpreted several 
ways (Russo et al., 1996). In research exploring predecisional distortion in mock trial 
settings, Carlson and Russo (2001) found that mock jurors distorted incoming 
evidence to conform with their preexisting beliefs in both civil and criminal cases, 
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even when warned not to do so and admonished in judicial instructions. The likelihood 
of engaging in predecisional distortion was even greater when jurors were more 
confident in a leading verdict (Carlson & Russo, 2001). 
 Like predecisional distortion, motivated cognition and reasoning can distort 
individuals’ perceptions of new evidence in light of their verdict preference (Kahan, 
2013). In a legal context, Sood (2015) found that participants acting as judges were 
more likely to interpret illegally obtained evidence as permissible when the crime was 
more severe compared to less severe. Thus, participants perceived illegally obtained 
evidence and even case law differently depending on what case outcome they 
preferred (Sood, 2015).      
 Research regarding predecisional distortion and motivated reasoning suggests 
that reasoning requirements may not be more successful in promoting verdict accuracy 
or reducing bias compared to general verdicts. Research in these areas suggests that a 
reasoning requirement may not actually reduce bias in jurors’ reasoning or promote 
decision accuracy if the reasons are required after jurors are already likely to have a 
leading preference for a verdict. Instead, the reasoning requirement may increase juror 
confidence without increasing the deliberative processing of evidence before an 
intuitive decision regarding verdict is made.  
Coherence-based Reasoning 
 Research regarding coherence-based reasoning (Simon, 2004) also suggests 
that the reasoning requirement may not protect jurors from biased decision making. 
According to Simon (2004), coherence-based reasoning is likely at play during 
complex decision making tasks. This model of reasoning proposes that decisions are 
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made as a product of cognitive processes that occur bi-directionally: “Premises and 
facts both determine conclusions and are affected by them in return” (Simon, 2004, p. 
511). Further, Simon (2004) argues that “[a] natural result of this cognitive process is 
a skewing of the premises and facts toward inflated support for the chosen decision” 
(p. 511). According to this model, as one option becomes more and more favored, it is 
perceived as increasingly strong while the alternative option is perceived as weaker 
and weaker, which increases confidence in the leading choice and makes it seem like 
an obvious option. 
 These theoretical assumptions have been empirically tested utilizing mock jury 
paradigms. Simon (2004) finds that information regarding the character of the 
defendant (e.g., malevolent or benevolent) affects mock jurors’ verdict determinations, 
ratings of other case-related evidence, and unrelated variables. Related research 
(Simon, Stenstrom, & Read, 2015) also finds that emotion manipulations completely 
unrelated to a decision task can trigger coherent shifts in motivation and liking of key 
characters in vignettes. This research suggests that a reasoning requirement may not be 
enough to promote stronger juror decisions: Once jurors begin to favor one verdict 
over another, their interpretation of new evidence is likely to be distorted to conform 
to their preference, and the reasons they provide after making their decisions will 
likely be formed completely post hoc, all to align with their preferred verdict.  
Study Overview 
 Jury decision making in the context of general verdicts is, of course, not 
without challenges, and can be susceptible to biases. For instance, one study suggests 
that mock jurors have better recognition for evidence that aligns with their verdict 
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preference, and mock jurors at times incorrectly recalled information that was never 
presented if it fit their narrative of the trial evidence (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). 
Further, some research indicates that jurors may fail to discuss important topics, 
particularly if those topics relate to a verdict that no single juror is favoring (Ellsworth, 
1989). Juror discussions can also be “verdict-driven” rather than “evidence-driven,” 
(Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983), and verdict-driven deliberations are more likely 
than evidence-driven deliberations to end in a hung jury (Hannaford, Dann, & 
Munsterman, 1998). 
However, research suggests that jurors typically make sound decisions: U.S. 
judges are often in agreement with juries’ criminal and civil verdicts (Eisenberg et al., 
2005), and the strength of the evidence presented at trial is the best predictor of juries’ 
verdicts (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Juror reasoning during deliberation is often complex, 
and mock jurors make connections and inferences based on trial evidence, properly 
reference the law in their discussions, and often are able to accurately resolve 
questions regarding case facts (Ellsworth, 1989).  
Despite the lack of empirical research regarding reasoned verdicts, several 
countries have established a reasoning requirement for jurors. Given the applicable 
research described above regarding how individuals and groups generally make 
decisions, it is important to investigate how jurors make decisions across these varied 
contexts and verdict procedures. The current study examined juror decision making 
across four verdict procedures, including general verdicts, special verdicts, and two 
variations of verdict procedures that require jurors to provide reasons for their 
judgments. In the verdict conditions requiring reasons, mock jurors were asked to give 
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a general verdict. In one condition (the Reasons After condition), they were asked to 
provide reasons for their judgments after rendering a verdict finding for the plaintiff or 
the defendant, which bears some similarity to the reasoning requirements seen abroad. 
In the other condition (the Reasons Before condition), mock jurors were asked to 
provide reasons for why they might find for the plaintiff or for the defendant before 
finding for the plaintiff or the defendant. It is important to consider if and when a 
reasoning requirement might promote stronger juror decision making, as, to our 
knowledge, countries do not typically require that jurors provide reasons before they 
begin the other verdict tasks.  
In order to explore whether these verdict procedures might increase juror 
decision accuracy and reduce bias, plaintiff race varied: In half of the conditions, the 
plaintiff had a stereotypically European American name (the No-bias condition), and 
in the other half, a stereotypically African American name (the Bias condition). If one 
or more of these verdict procedures reduces the impact of racial bias, then we should 
expect to see fair treatment across plaintiff race. 
Hypotheses 
 Based on the above literature, several predictions were made regarding jurors’ 
verdicts, verdict confidence, and confidence in awarded damages, when applicable. 
Verdict 
It was hypothesized that participants would be more likely to find for the 
defendant in the Bias conditions, with the exception of the Reasons Before conditions. 
Requiring mock jurors to provide reasons in support of the plaintiff and defendant 
before they render a judgment should mitigate the effects of racial bias. Liu (2017) 
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found that requiring mock judges to provide reasons before rendering a judgment 
substantially reduced the effect of emotion compared to those who did not provide 
reasons before making a determination of guilt. Further, Liu (2017) found that writing 
reasons after rendering a judgment did not reduce the impact of emotional bias.  
 Generally, mock jurors’ decisions are expected to be similar in the General and 
Special Verdict conditions. Wiggins and Breckler (1990) explored juror decision 
making when jurors were asked to render either a special or general verdict: Their 
work suggests no difference between these two procedures. Instead, mock jurors’ 
decisions were driven by their overall perceptions of the case and witnesses. In 
contrast, research with actual jurors found that jurors who had used verdict forms felt 
more informed and felt that they had reached a correct decision compared to those 
who did not use a verdict form (Heuer & Penrod, 1994).  
It was further posited that mock jurors would find for the plaintiff more often 
in the Bias + Reasons Before a General Verdict condition, compared to the Bias + 
Reasons After a General Verdict condition. Racial bias should decrease the likelihood 
of finding for the plaintiff, and this should be exacerbated in the Reasons After 
conditions. However, when mock jurors are asked to provide reasons in support of the 
plaintiff and defendant before rendering a finding, support for the plaintiff should 
become more equal.  Research by Simon (2004) suggests that an instruction to mock 
jurors to consider the opposite of their leading preference reduces coherence to a 
preexisting belief.  
It was also expected that participants’ overall impressions of the case (e.g., 
impressions of the plaintiff and defendant) would predict jurors’ judgments, such that 
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the more favorable one’s impressions of the plaintiff, the more likely they would be to 
find for the plaintiff. Importantly, it was hypothesized that, across all conditions 
except for those in the Reasons Before conditions, jurors’ experience of emotions 
would independently predict their finding for the plaintiff or defendant. 
Verdict Confidence 
It is difficult to make a prediction regarding confidence in general versus 
special verdict conditions. In one study, mock jurors utilizing a special verdict 
procedure were less confident in their judgments compared to those employing a 
general verdict (Wiggins & Breckler, 1990). In contrast, actual jurors who utilized a 
verdict form felt more confident in their decision compared to those who did not use 
such a form (Heuer & Penrod, 1994). Importantly, verdict forms in this study were not 
randomly assigned, so it is possible that other differences existed in these trials in 
addition to the verdict forms used. 
No prediction was made regarding confidence in the Reasons Before 
conditions: One study suggests that asking mock jurors to consider the opposite of 
their preferred belief before rendering a judgment did not decrease juror confidence in 
their decisions (Simon, 2004). However, Liu (2017) found that participants acting as 
judges were much less confidence when asked to provide reasons before making a 
decision compared to those who were not asked to provide reasons.   
Damages 
 Based on previous research by Wiggins and Breckler (1990), it was 
hypothesized that damage awards would be higher in the special verdict conditions 
compared to the general verdict conditions. In their research, they found that mock 
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jurors awarded more compensatory damages when using a special compared to a 
general verdict procedure, and the current study only inquired about this type of 
award.  
It was further expected that damage awards would be higher for the plaintiff in 
the No Bias conditions compared to Bias conditions. Researchers examined over 9,000 
civil jury trials in Illinois and found that African American litigants (plaintiffs and 
defendants) lost more often than European American litigants, and African American 
plaintiffs were awarded smaller sums (Chin & Peterson, 1985).   
Methods 
Participants 
 In the current study, two separate forms of recruitment were used. Four 
hundred twelve individuals began the survey, 235 (57% of total sample) of which 
were recruited utilizing snowball sampling via email, social media, and word of 
mouth. Participants in this sample volunteered their time and were not compensated 
for their participation. One hundred seventy-seven participants (43% of total sample) 
were recruited utilizing Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) and 
Turk Prime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). Individuals in this sample who 
completed the full survey (n = 140) were compensated $2.00 for their participation. 
 Participants across both samples were included in the final analyses if they 
completed two or more attention check questions correctly (out of three). An 
independent samples t-test of the total sample revealed that the samples did not differ 
in terms of attention check accuracy, p = .33. Seventy individuals were excluded from 
the Mechanical Turk sample (final n = 107; 40.1% of total final sample) while 75 were 
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excluded from the general sample (final n = 160; 59.9% of total final sample). An 
independent samples t-test of individuals who accurately answered at least two 
attention check questions correctly revealed that these sub-samples did not vary in 
their accuracy, p = .39.  
 Participants across the sub-samples were dissimilar in terms of age, gender, 
education, and race / ethnicity. However, chi-square (p = .53) and logistic regression 
analyses (p = .99) revealed that participants across both sub-samples decided verdict 
similarly. Further, participants from the sub-samples were evenly distributed across 
the Bias (p = .64) and Verdict Procedure manipulations, p = .97. Thus, the samples 
were collapsed, and all subsequent analyses were performed on one sample. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of mock jurors who found for the plaintiff across conditions. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics
 Total Sample (N = 267) General Sample (n = 107) MTurk Sample (n = 160)  
 n or range % or mean n or range % or mean n or range % or mean p value 
Age 19-77 38.03 19-77 40.72 22-66 34.13 <.001 
Race/Ethnicity:                         
         African American 
    Hispanic 
Asian  
Native American 
  Caucasian  
Other 
24 
19 
10 
2 
200 
8 
9.1% 
7.2% 
3.8% 
0.8% 
76% 
3.0% 
5 
13 
2 
1 
130 
5 
3.2% 
8.3% 
1.3% 
0.6% 
83.3% 
3.2% 
19 
6 
8 
1 
70 
3 
17.8% 
5.6% 
7.5% 
0.9% 
65.4% 
2.8% 
<.001 
Sex/Gender Identification:        
Cis-Male 
Cis-Female 
Trans-Male 
Trans – Female 
Non-binary 
Other 
92 
147 
16 
1 
1 
3 
35.4% 
56.5% 
6.2% 
0.4% 
0.4% 
1.2% 
34 
107 
9 
0 
1 
2 
22.2% 
69.9% 
5.9% 
0.0% 
0.7% 
1.3% 
58 
40 
7 
1 
0 
1 
54.2% 
37.4% 
6.5% 
0.9% 
0.0% 
0.9% 
<.001 
Education        
< High School 
High School / GED 
Some College 
College Graduate 
Some Graduate School 
Graduate Degree 
1 
20 
72 
85 
25 
60 
0.4% 
7.6% 
27.4% 
32.3% 
9.5% 
22.8% 
0 
10 
42 
39 
20 
45 
0.0% 
6.4% 
26.9% 
25.0% 
12.8% 
28.8% 
1 
10 
30 
46 
5 
15 
0.9% 
9.3% 
28.0% 
43.0% 
4.7% 
14.0% 
<.01 
Verdict for Plaintiff 176 66.2% 105 66.0% 71 66.4% >.05 
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Design 
 The currently study employed a 2 (Bias: African American Plaintiff vs. 
European American Plaintiff) x 4 (Verdict Procedure: General Verdict vs. Special 
Verdict vs. Reasons Before a General Verdict vs. Reasons After a General Verdict) 
fully-crossed design.  
Materials 
 Evidence presentation. Participants began by reading a brief case summary. 
The plaintiff, either Latoya Jackson or Jennifer Becker, depending on condition, sued 
the defendant, John Morgan, for defamation. The plaintiff, who had been previously 
employed for almost two years as a maid in the defendant’s home, claimed the 
defendant injured her reputation by falsely accusing her of theft. Mr. and Mrs. Morgan 
implied that the plaintiff stole an expensive piece of jewelry, at which point the 
plaintiff left their home. After, the plaintiff claimed she applied for many new jobs, 
but was unemployable after receiving a negative character reference from Mr. 
Morgan. Specifically, she claims that Morgan defamed her to a potential employer at a 
country club, Howard Barlow, who was the general manager of the club. The missing 
jewelry was ultimately found in the Morgans’ home in the library, which Mr. Morgan 
disclosed to Mr. Barlow. Next, participants read judicial instructions detailing the 
claims against the defendant, the standard of proof, and possible defenses. As 
discussed above, the plaintiff’s name in all case materials and questionnaires varied 
according to condition.     
Experimental manipulations.  In the current study, both verdict procedure 
and bias were manipulated. Verdict procedure varied across condition, and a different 
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verdict form was used for each of the four possible verdict procedures: General 
Verdict vs. Special Verdict vs. Reasons Before a General Verdict vs. Reasons After a 
General Verdict. In the General Verdict conditions, participants were simply asked to 
find for the Plaintiff or the Defendant.  
In the Special Verdict conditions, mock jurors were asked to answer four yes 
or no questions: Did the Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker, prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, John Morgan, made a defamatory 
statement against her?; Did the Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker, prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defamatory statement injured her?; Did the 
Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker, prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the Defendant, John Morgan, made the defamatory statement with malice toward 
the Plaintiff (Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker), or with a reckless disregard for her 
interests?; and Did the defendant, John Morgan, prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defamatory statement was true?. 
In the Reasons Before a General Verdict conditions, mock jurors were first 
asked to answer two questions: What legal and factual reasons may justify finding for 
the Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson, in this case? and What legal and factual reasons may 
justify finding for the Defendant, John Morgan, in this case? Participants could write 
as many reasons, and for as long as they wished. Then, on the next page of the survey, 
mock jurors were asked to find for the Plaintiff or the Defendant. In the Reasons After 
a General Verdict conditions, participation occurred very similarly, except participants 
first found for the Plaintiff or Defendant, and then on a subsequent page, were asked to 
respond to the two above questions in order to give their reasons. 
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Bias was induced by manipulating the plaintiff’s name: In the Bias conditions, 
the plaintiff had a stereotypically African American name (Latoya Jackson), while in 
the No Bias conditions, the Plaintiff had a stereotypically European American name 
(Jennifer Becker). First names were selected from a database of 4,250 first names 
(Tzioumis, 2018): The database contains information relating to the count and 
proportion of first names for men and women across six racial groups. To choose a 
common first name for both African and European Americans, the data was first 
sorted by percentage of individuals holding these first names within each racial 
category from most to least, and then compared these names to overall number of 
occurrences of the name across the general population. Latoya was chosen as 91.18 
percent of individuals with that name were African American, and 93 individuals in 
the data set were named Latoya. Using the same process, Jennifer was chosen. 19,356 
women in the database were named Jennifer, and of those, 94.44% were European 
American.  
Next, the name Jackson was chosen to represent the African American plaintiff 
utilizing a frequency table by Comenetz (2016) based on the 2010 Census Data (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). Jackson was chosen as it ranked 19 out of all African 
American surnames, with 708,099 individuals having Jackson as a last name 
(Comenetz, 2016). Becker was chosen to represent the European American plaintiff as 
it ranked 315 of surnames, and 96.4% of individuals with this last name were 
classified as White (Gaddis, 2017, citing U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  
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Measures 
 Affect. Mock jurors completed an affect questionnaire containing several items 
from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Participants were asked to indicate how they felt, right now, using a scale 
ranging from 1 (Very slightly to not at all) to 5 (Extremely) for a large variety of 
emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety, calm, disgust, surprised, upset). 
 Attention checks. Mock jurors were asked three attention check questions: 
What crime was the defendant, John Morgan, accused of?, Where was the missing 
jewelry found?, and How long did Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker work as a maid 
for the Morgan family?.  
 Case-related judgments questionnaire. After rendering a verdict, mock 
jurors were asked to rate their confidence in their decision from 1 (Not at all 
confident) to 7 (Very confident). Participants who found for the Plaintiff were then 
asked to choose an appropriate damage award, to rate their confidence in the assigned 
award amount from 1 (Not at all confident) to 7 (Very confident), and to indicate how 
difficult it was to pick an exact award amount from 1 (Not at all difficult) to 7 
(Extremely difficult). 
 Next, mock jurors were asked to indicate their impressions of the Plaintiff 
using seven-point bipolar scales for characteristics such as Immoral – Moral and 
Unlikeable – Likeable. Next, mock jurors indicated their impressions of the Plaintiff’s 
case using a seven-point bipolar scale for items such as Unpersuasive – Persuasive and 
Unbelievable – Believable. Mock jurors were then asked to indicate how bad they 
perceived the Plaintiff’s suffering from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) and their overall 
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impression of the Plaintiff from 1 (Extremely negative) to 7 (Extremely positive). 
Participants then completed questions pertaining to their impressions of the defendant 
using the same scale as for the Plaintiff, as well as questions relating to their 
impressions of the Defendant’s case, which were identical to those for the Plaintiff. 
Mock jurors were then asked to what extent they believed the Defendant’s actions 
caused the Plaintiff’s suffering from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely).  
 Next, mock jurors were asked to respond to general questions pertaining to 
their participation, including: How motivated were you while reading this trial 
summary?, How motivated were you while determining an award for the Plaintiff, 
Latoya Jackson’s / Jennifer Becker’s, suffering?, How much cognitive effort did you 
expend while reading this trial summary?, How much cognitive effort did you expend 
while determining an award for the Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson’s / Jennifer Becker’s, 
suffering?, How much of a role did punishment of the Defendant, John Morgan, factor 
into your award decision?, and How much of a role did economic losses of the 
Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker, factor into your award decision? Only 
jurors who had found for the Plaintiff answered questions pertaining to an award: For 
those who found for the Defendant, questions relating to an award were not displayed.  
 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT): The CRT (Frederick, 2005) assesses 
individual’s ability to curb fast, intuitive, wrong responses to questions, and to instead 
answer utilizing more deliberative processing to respond correctly. 
Demographic questionnaire. Mock jurors then answered several 
demographic questions pertaining to citizenship, age, sex, ethnicity, education, 
number of STEM classes taken, and political orientation. 
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 Manipulation check. Mock jurors were asked: What is the race/ethnicity of 
the Plaintiff, Latoya Jackson / Jennifer Becker, who worked as a maid for the Morgan 
family?. Options included Black / African American, White / European American, 
Hispanic, Asian / Pacific Islander, and other (please specify). It was the intention to 
include the “other” category such that participants could include, when applicable, 
their perception of the plaintiff’s race in cases where they felt her race was not 
represented by one of the four options (ie: Black / African American, White / 
European American, Hispanic, Asian / Pacific Islander). However, early in data 
collection it was discovered that a handful of participants selected “other” and 
expressed that they did not know or were unsure of the plaintiff’s race. The “other” 
option was then changed to “Other race / ethnicity” and the “please specify” option 
was removed.  
Procedures 
 First, consent was obtained. All materials and measures were administered 
online utilizing Qualtrics. Survey links were disseminated to the general population 
sample via email, social media, and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk via the TurkPrime 
platform. Thus, all participation occurred online. 
Participants acting as mock jurors began by reading through a brief case 
summary and judicial instructions. After, participants were asked to respond to three 
attention check questions, followed by the affect questionnaire. Immediately after, 
jurors rendered a verdict utilizing one of the four randomly assigned verdict 
procedures: a general verdict; a special verdict; a verdict procedure requiring that they 
provide reasons for why they might find for the plaintiff or defendant before giving 
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their verdict; or a verdict procedure requiring that they provide reasons for why they 
might find for the plaintiff or defendant after giving their verdict, and to rate their 
confidence in their verdict decision. Mock jurors who found for the Plaintiff were 
asked to award damages and answered several questions pertaining to the damages 
awarded, including confidence in their award decision, and how difficult it was to pick 
an exact award.  
Next, mock jurors answered questions regarding their overall impressions of 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s case, and perceptions of her suffering; overall 
impressions of the defendant and the defendant’s case, and extent they believed the 
defendant caused the plaintiff suffering; questions regarding how motivated they were 
while reading the trial and when determining an award (if applicable); how much 
cognitive effort they expended reading the trial and in determining an award (if 
applicable); if applicable, how much punishing the defendant played a role in their 
award, and how much the plaintiff’s economic losses factored into their award; the 
Cognitive Reflection Task; and basic demographic questions. Lastly, participants 
completed a manipulation check that asked them to select the race/ethnicity of the 
plaintiff. 
Results 
Factor Scores 
 Confirmatory factor analyses were utilized for positive and negative affect, 
perceptions of the defendant and his case, and perceptions of the plaintiff and her case. 
Principal-axis factor analyses were conducted for each of these categories, and a single 
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factor was extracted for each category. These standardized scores were then used for 
subsequent analyses.  
 Next, using these composite scores, difference scores were created for 
perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant (perceptions of the plaintiff – perceptions of 
the defendant) and perceptions of the plaintiff and defendants’ cases (perceptions of 
the plaintiff’s case – perceptions of the defendant’s case). These difference scores 
were used in subsequent analyses.  
Verdict and Verdict Confidence 
  Across all conditions, 66.2% of participants found for the plaintiff. These rates 
parallel other similar research (Wiggins & Breckler, 1990). As discussed above, a 
logistic regression analysis was conducted to test for a three-way interaction between 
the independent variables (Bias and Verdict Procedure) and Sample. Analyses 
revealed that the overall model was significant, χ2 = 128.85, p < .001. However, the 
three-way interaction was not significant, Wald = 3.18, p = .36. All subsequent 
analyses were performed on the total sample. 
 Next, a logistic regression analysis was performed to investigate whether Bias 
and/or Verdict Procedure independently predicted verdict, over and above 
participants’ overall impressions of the plaintiff and defendant and positive and 
negative affect. Analyses revealed that the overall model was significant, χ2 = 125.43, 
p < .001. Bias did not significantly predict verdict, b = -.15, SE = .39, Wald = .14, p = 
.71, odds ratio = .87.  
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Table 2 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) loadings and cumulative variance of perceptions of the 
plaintiff and defendant  
 
                 Item                                Loading_____ 
 
Perceptions of the Defendant 
Believable        .835 
 Blameless        .785 
 Candid         .823 
 Honest         .862 
 Likeable        .810 
 Moral         .827 
 Reputable        .788 
 Right         .785 
 Overall Impression       .815 
 
Variance: 66.4% 
 
Perceptions of the Defendant’s Case 
 Believable        .885 
 Convincing        .947 
 Persuasive        .863 
 Serious         .645  
 Strong         .853 
 
Variance: 71.42% 
  
Perceptions of the Plaintiff 
 Believable        .863 
 Blameless        .813 
 Candid         .848 
 Honest         .904 
 Likeable        .888 
 Moral         .892 
 Reputable        .872 
 Right         .887 
 Overall Impression       .674 
 
Variance: 72.55% 
 
Perceptions of the Plaintiff’s Case 
 Believable        .901 
 Convincing         .941 
 Persuasive        .852 
 Serious         .752 
 Strong         .861 
 
Variance: 74.61% 
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Table 3 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) loadings and cumulative variance of affect 
 
                 Item                               Loading  
 
Negative Affect 
Afraid          .748 
Anger          .767 
Anxious         .744 
Ashamed        .833 
Disgusted        .789 
Guilty          .794 
Hostile         .737 
Irritable        .807 
Jittery          .770 
Sad         .797 
Upset          .742 
Contemptuous        .631 
 
Variance: 58.49%  
 
Positive Affect 
Attentive        .132 
Calm          .353 
Enthusiastic        .774 
Happy         .719 
Inspired        .762 
Strong         .728 
Surprised        .363 
 
Variance: 35.72% 
 
However, Verdict Procedure significantly impacted verdict, Wald = 26.62, p < 
.001. Participants utilizing Special Verdict procedures were significantly less likely to 
find for the plaintiff compared to participants in all other Verdict Procedure 
conditions. Participants who rendered a General Verdict (b = 2.48, SE = .56, Wald = 
19.92, p < .001, odds ratio = 11.97), provided reasons before a General Verdict (b = 
1.56, SE = .53, Wald = 8.67, p < .003, odds ratio = 4.77), or provided reasons after 
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rendering a General Verdict (b = 2.42, SE = .55, Wald = 19.08, p < .001, odds ratio = 
11.24) were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff compared to those in the 
special verdict conditions. There was no significant interaction between Bias and 
Verdict Procedure, Wald = 2.75, p = .43. This finding stands in contrast to similar 
research (Wiggins & Breckler, 1990) who found that jurors were equally likely to find 
for the plaintiff when rendering either a special or general verdict.  
Mock jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant’s cases independently 
predicted verdict, b = 1.29, SE = .25, Wald = 27.24, p < .001, odds ratio = 3.63. 
Participants’ perceptions of the plaintiff and defendant, positive, and negative affect 
did not significantly predict verdict, ps > .19.  
An exploratory model was examined that included the above model and 
participants’ scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test. However, while the overall 
model significance remained the same (p < .001), CRT scores did not significantly 
predict verdict, p = .14. 
 Contrary to predictions, verdict confidence did not vary by Bias (F (1, 258) = 
.24, p = .63, ηp2 = .001) or Verdict Procedure (F (3, 258) = 1.27, p = .29, ηp2 = .015), 
and there was no significant interaction, F (3, 258) = .08, p = .97, ηp2 = .001. 
Damages 
 Across all conditions, damages ranged from $0 to $1,000,000, M = $72,382.43, 
SD = $154,598.83. A two-way Analysis of Variance revealed that Bias (F (1, 168) = 
.001, p = .98, ηp2 < .001) and Verdict Procedure (F (3, 168) = .90, p = .44, ηp2 = .016) 
did not significantly predict damages, and there was no significant interaction, F (3, 
168) = 1.70, p = .17, ηp2 = .029. 
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Figure 2. Average damages awarded across conditions. Error bars represent standard 
errors 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate the impact of Bias and 
Verdict Procedure on participants’ motivation and cognitive effort expended while 
reading the case summary. A Multivariate Analysis of Variance revealed no 
significant differences across groups, ps > .39. 
 Further exploratory analyses were conducted using linguistic analyses software 
(Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015) in 
order to explore mock jurors’ written reasons. A 2 (reasons before verdict vs. reasons 
after verdict) x 2 (bias vs. no bias) x 2 (reasons for plaintiff vs. reasons for defendant) 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance indicated no effect of the timing of reasons (F (87, 
133) = .93, p = .63, ηp2 = .379) or bias induction, F (87, 133) = 1.00, p = .50, ηp2 = 
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provided for the plaintiff or defendant, F (87, 133) = 1.60, p = .007, ηp2 = .511. No 
significant differences were found amongst the interactions, ps > .36. 
 Participants’ usage of words in the analytical (p <.001) and power (p = .007) 
categories were significantly higher in reasons provided for the plaintiff versus the 
defendant. The analytical category reflects logical and formal thinking, while the 
power category includes words reflective of dominance, social status, and social 
hierarchies. Conversely, participants’ usage of words in the emotional tone (p = .008) 
category was significantly higher in reasons provided for the defendant versus the 
plaintiff. Higher numbers in the emotional tone category indicate more positivity.  
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Mock Juror Language by LIWC Category 
LIWC Dictionary Category  Mean SD p 
Analytical Plaintiff 73.71 28.93 < .001 
 Defendant 52.65 38.12  
Emotional Tone Plaintiff 18.09 22.98 .008 
 Defendant 27.24 29.34  
Power Plaintiff 2.61 3.68 .007 
 Defendant 1.46 2.58  
 
Discussion 
  Given the contemporary movement towards a reasoning requirement for juries 
abroad, it is important to empirically investigate the relative impact of verdict 
procedures on jury decision making. The current study is the first to explore the 
influence of the reasoning requirement on mock jurors decision making in comparison 
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to general and special verdict procedures. The current study provides some evidence to 
suggest that a reasoning requirement may not promote stronger decision making than 
other more common verdict procedures. 
 While it was hypothesized that participants who rendered either a general or 
special verdict would decide the case in favor of the plaintiff at similar rates, the 
special verdict procedure appeared to drastically reduce the likelihood of finding for 
the plaintiff. In fact, the special verdict procedure was least likely to lead to a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff. This finding is important as this procedure is the only of the 
four within the current study which took away jurors’ power to determine the ultimate 
verdict: When utilizing the special verdict, jurors had no opportunity to make a 
holistic decision regarding the defendant’s liability, as liability was determined by 
jurors’ responses to the four factual questions regarding the case. This finding 
contrasts other research suggesting that jurors’ utilizing general or special verdicts 
decide cases similarly (Wiggins & Breckler, 1990).  
 A few case-specific differences exist between the current research and work by 
Wiggins and Breckler (1990). For instance, mock jurors in the current research heard 
only one claim of defamation, while those in the research conducted by Wiggins and 
Breckler (1990) heard two claims. Further, Wiggins and Breckler (1990) argue 
“special verdicts are more likely to be biased against one of the parties, relative to 
general verdicts, when the jury does not know the legal consequences of answers to 
special verdict questions” (p 36). It is possible that jurors in the current study who 
rendered a special verdict were not aware of the legal implications of their answers to 
the factual questions: Given that mock jurors were significantly more likely in the 
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other three conditions to find for the plaintiff, it is surprising that mock jurors who 
rendered a special verdict were so much more likely to find for the defendant. This 
makes intuitive sense if in fact mock jurors were unaware of the legal implications of 
their answers to the fact-based questions: if so, the special verdict procedure may have 
prevented them from rendering a decision based on their holistic view of the case.  
 In addition, in Wiggins and Breckler’s (1990) study, the addition of a second 
claim of defamation might have had an additive impact such that mock jurors, aware 
of the legal implications of the special verdict form, were equally likely to find for the 
plaintiff as those in the general verdict. Wiggins and Breckler (1990) argue that their 
case materials may have produced equal bias against the plaintiff as defendant: “the 
number of special verdict questions could have produced a bias against the plaintiff, 
whereas the emphasis placed on multiple legal claims may have produced a bias 
against the defendant” (p 32).  
 Importantly, mock jurors’ decisions were comparable when utilizing general 
verdicts and when jurors were required to provide reasons before or after rendering a 
general verdict. In the current study, the reasoning requirement did not appear to 
change jurors’ verdicts. However, contrary to hypotheses, there was no effect of the 
Bias induction on mock jurors’ decisions. If the bias induction had been successful, 
there may have been significant differences to be seen amongst the verdict procedure 
conditions. However, it is still important to note that those in the special verdict 
conditions decided the case significantly differently compared to participants in all 
other conditions. Further, the case summary presented was rather balanced, and even 
so, the majority of participants found for the plaintiff, despite weak evidence that the 
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defendant had prevented her from acquiring employment. This lends some support to 
suggest that the reasoning requirement may not change juror decision making 
processes.  
 In line with predictions and similar research, perceptions of the defendant and 
plaintiffs’ cases also significantly predicted verdict, independent of verdict procedure 
(Wiggins & Breckler, 1990). This again suggests that jurors decided the case similarly 
across conditions with the exception of the special verdict conditions. Thus, in the 
current study verdict procedures did not appear to affect jurors’ perceptions of the 
defendant or plaintiffs’ cases. Contrary to predictions and other research, verdict 
confidence did not vary across conditions (Heurer & Penrod, 1994; Wiggins & 
Breckler, 1990). Mock jurors were relatively confident regardless of verdict 
procedure. In addition, mock juror affect did not independently predict verdict. While 
the current case portrayed a sympathetic plaintiff, the case and claims presented did 
not seem to elicit strong moral emotions in mock jurors.  
 Lastly, mock jurors assessed damages similarly across conditions. While there 
was a wide range of damages awarded ranging from zero to one million, mock jurors 
generally assessed similar amounts, regardless of plaintiff race or verdict procedure. 
This finding, although counter to prediction, is supported by other research finding 
that mock jurors award similar amounts to plaintiff’s across special and general 
verdicts (Wiggins & Breckler, 1990). However, there appears to be a trend towards 
mock jurors assessing more damages in the special verdict condition, particularly 
when the plaintiff is African American. However, this finding was not significant, 
perhaps because the current study was somewhat underpowered, and because so few 
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mock jurors found for the plaintiff in the special verdict conditions. Further, in the 
other verdict procedure conditions, mock jurors granted lower awards to African 
American plaintiffs, although this trend was not significant. 
 Interestingly, exploratory analyses revealed significant differences in the 
language uses of jurors when providing reasons in favor of the plaintiff versus the 
defendant. Although there were no significant differences between the reasoning 
requirement conditions, these findings provide initial insight into how jurors’ language 
use differs in their reasons provided for the plaintiff and defendant.  
Legal Implications 
The current study is but the first step towards exploring the reasoning 
requirement debate. While the current study does not suggest an effect of the 
reasoning requirement on juror decision making, future research must examine the 
reasoning requirement in other contexts, particularly in cases that might induce more 
bias. If in fact the reasoning requirement does not promote verdict accuracy, courts 
must consider the costs of such procedural changes (Burd & Hans, in press).  
The current study provides some evidence to suggest that mock jurors distorted 
incoming information to match their intuitive beliefs about liability in this case. Mock 
jurors in the special verdict conditions, who could not make an ultimate determination 
of liability, were significantly more likely to find for the defendant. This finding is 
supported by other research finding that individuals distort incoming information to 
conform to an existing preference (e.g., Russo et al., 1996). However, in the other 
conditions where jurors provided a general verdict (with or without reasons), mock 
jurors were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff, despite balanced and 
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ambiguous case evidence, which stands in contrast to other research (Wiggins & 
Breckler, 1990). In the current case, mock jurors were likely unaware of the 
ramifications of answering the four factual questions on the special verdict forms. 
Thus, because they rendered a special verdict, they were arguably less likely to decide 
the case holistically (Henderson et al., 1995).  
Determining which verdict procedure is “best” is both an empirical and 
normative issue: While in some cases it might be possible to establish which verdict 
procedure is strongest in terms of juror decision making (e.g., if empirical research 
discovered that one procedure was most likely to reduce juror bias), there are several 
other important values that may be met by a variety of these procedures (Z. Clopton, 
personal communication, September 29, 2017). For instance, special or reasoned 
verdicts could help promote transparency in juror decision making, and could help 
defendants on appeal. Such transparency could also improve the public’s perception of 
jury decision making, which could promote a sense of legitimacy for the institution 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Klijn, 2015; Jackson, Trinkner, & Tyler, in press).  
However, special verdicts and the sorts of reasoned verdict procedures used 
abroad suffer from a lack of procedural standardization, which could also reduce trial 
efficiency. Further, general verdicts allow jurors the most freedom to deliberate, and 
make jurors less vulnerable to external influence. In the event that future research 
finds evidence to suggest that reasoned verdicts promote juror decision making, 
procedures may remain unchanged so as to preserve jury independence (Z. Clopton, 
personal communication, September 29, 2017), or as a way to preserving another 
competing value (N. Marder, personal communication, September 26, 2017). 
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Limitations and Future Directions  
 The current study investigated mock juror, but not jury decision making. It is 
important to explore the relative impact of the reasoning requirement on mock jurors 
and jurors who deliberate as a group. Further, the bias induction utilized in the current 
study was not strong enough to allow for the investigation of whether the reasoning 
requirement actually can actually reduce bias in jurors, or reduce arbitrary decision 
making. Further, because the case summary presented to mock jurors was not 
particularly emotionally charged, this research could not determine whether a 
reasoning requirement might reduce the impact of juror emotion. 
 Future research should explore the impact of these varied verdict procedures 
across a myriad of case types, including mock criminal trials. It is important to assess 
the likelihood that a reasoning requirement might reduce juror bias; thus, future 
studies should include a stronger bias induction. In addition, to investigate further the 
possibility that the reasoning requirement may mitigate the impact of strong moral 
and/or emotional intuitions, more severe crimes should be presented.  
 The current research suggests that mock jurors might discuss and reason about 
plaintiffs and defendants differently. Future research should investigate further how 
mock jurors’ language use might systematically vary in how they think about plaintiffs 
and defendants. Granholm and Richards (1994) argue that language impacts ideas, 
which can inform juries’ verdicts. Further, custom LIWC dictionaries could be created 
based on a sub-sample of participants’ responses based on a custom coding scheme of 
common themes; then, participants’ responses could be analyzed with the custom 
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dictionary to explore similarities and dissimilarities across participants’ writing 
responses.    
Conclusion  
 A reasoning requirement would certainly make the process of a trial more 
transparent, generally to the public, and specifically to defendants on appeal. 
However, the current study provides little evidence to suggest that the reasoning 
requirement changes mock jurors’ decisions, or that it would be more likely to 
mitigate implicit biases in jurors during these complex decision making processes. 
Importantly, the lack of standardization in verdict procedures with a reasoning 
requirement makes it difficult to, 1) assess the implications of these procedures, 2) 
determine which, if any, might actually promote less arbitrary decision making in 
jurors. These procedural difficulties might outweigh their potential benefits, and such 
procedures drastically reduce jury independence. Much research is needed to further 
parse the impact of a reasoning requirement on juror decision making. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 In this thesis, I demonstrated that cognitive processes, memories, and decision 
making can vary drastically across decision contexts, even for individuals 
experiencing the same stimuli. The first study provided evidence that group 
membership, even in extremely minimal contexts, has enduring effects on children’s 
memories for actions committed by in- and out-group members. In the second study, I 
presented initial findings that suggest purpose in life writing interventions may serve 
as useful tools in increasing shooting decisions accuracy and reducing shooting 
decision response times. Lastly, the third study demonstrated that procedural 
innovations that require jurors provide reasons for their judgments (either before or 
after rending a verdict) are not likely to impact juror decision making; however, 
special verdicts, which reduce jurors’ power to make an ultimate determination, are 
likely to impact verdict outcomes. These findings have important implications for the 
criminal justice system.  
 Study one demonstrated that children’s memories of events are susceptible to 
biases that may endure over time. In line with other contemporary research, children’s 
memories of events must be examined carefully, and gently, as not to bias (or bias) 
their perceptions of events. In an inter-group context, these findings suggest that 
children may not be objective witnesses of events involving in- or out-group members. 
For instance, in a situation where a child witnessed a crime involving in- and out-
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group members, children may improperly recall events in a way that favors in-group 
members. Thus, special attention should be paid to children’s memories of events, 
particularly those involving children’s perceptions of in- and out-group members in 
ambiguous contexts. Future research should investigate how enduring these effects 
truly are, and ways of reducing such biases in children’s memories. 
 In my second study, I replicate previous research that finds individuals are 
faster to make shooting decisions for armed versus unarmed targets. Further, in line 
with other research, individuals were less accurate when making decisions regarding 
unarmed compared to armed African American suspects, but were equally accurate in 
shooting decisions regarding armed and unarmed European American suspects. 
Importantly, this study is believed to be the first to explore writing interventions aimed 
at reducing improper shootings, and demonstrated some success for participants asked 
to write about their purpose in life. Purposeful individuals were equally accurate in 
their shooting decisions regarding armed and unarmed suspects, and no evidence was 
found to suggest that the writing intervention negatively impacted decision accuracy 
overall, as general accuracy was still high for these participants. Further, purposeful 
participants were significantly faster in their shooting decisions, without sacrificing 
accuracy. This work provides intriguing preliminary insight into a potential 
intervention aimed at reducing improper shootings. Future research should explore by 
what mechanism or mechanisms purpose in life buffers individuals during this trying 
context.  
 Finally, study three revealed no evidence to suggest that a reasoning 
requirement impacts jurors’ decisions: Regardless of timing, jurors’ decisions were 
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equal across all verdict procedure contexts when rendering some variation of a general 
verdict. However, jurors’ verdicts were significantly different when rendering a 
special compared to general verdict. Special verdicts reduce juries’ power to make an 
ultimate determination, but here, led to verdicts more in line with the factual evidence 
presented in the mock trial. Further, in line with other research, mock jurors’ overall 
impressions of the plaintiff and defendants’ cases directly influenced verdict decisions, 
regardless of what verdict procedure was used. Future research should explore the 
reasoning requirement in criminal contexts, and for cases involving more emotionally 
and/or morally charged contexts wherein the reasoning requirement might reduce the 
impact of extra-legal factors on jury decisions. 
   Taken together, the above studies suggest several areas ripe for future 
research with important implications for the criminal justice system. It is imperative to 
reduce inequalities in the justice system and to generally improve decision making in 
these complex contexts, particularly during ambiguous circumstances that open the 
door to personal biases and perceptions. In these high-stakes contexts, lives may hang 
in the balance.
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Appendix A 
 
Stories 
 
Story A 
 
Sam / Sarah went to recess on the playground after lunch one day. His / her classmate 
left a toy to go use the bathroom. Sam / Sarah took the toy without the classmate’s 
permission and went to go play with other children. After school that day, Sam / Sarah 
went over to a friend’s house. He / She and his / her friend decided to play a 
videogame. Sam / Sarah was losing the game and became angry. Sam / Sarah was so 
upset that he / she broke the videogame system.  Later, he / she had to leave his 
friend’s house because of plans he made. He / She was going to the park to meet some 
friends as he / she does every week. Sam / Sarah knew that these friends would be 
hungry and would love a snack. He / She decided to make some cookies to bring to his 
/ her friends. When he / she got home that night, his / her parents told him that some 
family friends were coming over for dinner. Sam’s / Sarah’s parents were very busy 
cooking dinner and getting ready. He / She decided to help clean up the house before 
the friends arrived. 
 
 
Story B 
 
During school, Max / Mary and his / her friends were lining up for recess. Max / Mary 
did not like one of his classmates. He / She saw this classmate get in line ahead of him 
/ her. Max / Mary was not happy about this and tripped the classmate as they were 
walking. After Max / Mary got home, he / she noticed that his / her mom made a 
chocolate cake. His / Her mother left the cake on the table and told Max/ Mary not to 
touch it. When his / her mother left the kitchen, Max / Mary decided to take a piece of 
the cake anyway. Later that day, Max’s / Mary’s friend came over to play. He / She 
remembered that he / she got a cool new toy recently. Max’s / Mary’s friend was very 
excited about this awesome new toy. He / She decided to share the toy with his / her 
friend. Later, Max’s / Mary’s mom told him / her and his / her friend that it was time 
to do homework. Max / Mary loves math class and always answers the teacher’s 
questions about math problems. His / Her friend was having trouble with his math 
homework. Max / Mary helped his / her friend to finish all of the math homework. 
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Appendix B 
 
MGP Stimuli 
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Appendix C 
 
Sample Verdict Forms 
 
General Verdict 
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Special Verdict 
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Reasons Before General Verdict 
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Reasons After General Verdict 
 
